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Professional investment managers are responsible for the investment of an
ever-increasing part of the nation's wealth. Mutual funds manage trillions of
dollars of other people's money, while banks, insurance companies, pension
plans, investment advisers, broker-dealers, other institutions, and individuals
manage much more.1 The federal securities laws are an important element of
the legal regime governing investment management. 2 Investment managers
trigger federal securities laws when they offer or sell securities, and thus the
whole effect of these laws turns on what the word "security" means. An
investment manager who invests a client's funds in stocks or bonds is subject to
the federal securities laws. However, an investment management arrangement
may itself be a security. If it is, the federal securities laws attach as soon as the
investment manager offers to serve a prospective client even if the managed
funds will not be invested in statutory securities.
This Article explores the regulation of investment management
arrangements as securities. Part I briefly surveys the federal securities laws that
govern the offer and sale of securities by investment managers. Part I then
discusses the unusual circumstances of the early 1970s that led courts and the
Security and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to insist on a broad definition of
the word "security," which, it turns out, encompasses a wide variety of
investment management arrangements. Although the circumstances that led to
this expansion of the scope of the federal securities laws no longer apply, the
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This article, in a modified form, will comprise part of the authors' forthcoming treatise
on the law of investment management.
I See Martin J. Gruber, Another Puzzle: The Growth in Actively Managed Mutual
Funds, 51 J. FIN. 783, 784-85 (1996); see also Robert Charles Clark, The Four Stages of
Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management Treatises, 94 HARv. L. REv. 561, 564
(1981) ("The increasing separation of the decision about how to invest from the decision to
supply capital for investment is one of the most striking institutional developments in our
century."); Jane E. Wfllis, Banks and Mutual Funds: A Functional Approach to Reforn, 1995
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 221,221-23.
2 See infra Part I.A.
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law established in response to them still determines whether investment
management arrangements are securities. This law, created largely to fill gaps
in a dated regulatory regime, now poses substantial risks for investment
managers and threatens to distort the regulation of investment management.
Part II examines the law governing whether investment management
arrangements are securities, focusing on the requirement of common enterprise,
the relevance of the way control is allocated between manager and investor, and
the special status of trust arrangements. Part II deals with the related question
of whether collections of managed accounts are investment companies. Part IV
examines the principles and policies at play when investment management
arrangements are subjected to regulation under the federal securities laws.
Although courts called upon to judge investment management arrangements do
not always clearly articulate the principles that guide their decisions,
identification of these principles is essential for policymakers charged with
administering and perfecting the federal securities laws and for managers and
investors trying to structure their affairs to comply with them. This Article
concludes that the question of whether an investment management arrangement
is a security should turn on the degree to which the manager is responsive to the
individual situation and objectives of the owner of the managed assets.
I. APPLICATION OF THE SECURITIES LAWS TO INVESTMENT
MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS
A. Securities Laws Governing Investment Management Arrangements
The federal securities laws regulate the activities of investment managers
through three mechanisms: (1) the registration requirements of the Securities
Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"), 3 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Exchange Act"), 4 and the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("Investment
Company Act"), 5 which require the filing of extensive documentation with the
SEC and effectively force managers to disclose information to investors; (2) the
regulatory regimes of the Exchange Act, the Investment Company Act and the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940,6 which regulate the business practices of
investment managers; and (3) the broad proscriptions of fraudulent activity
contained in the several federal statutes. 7
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z (1994).
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811(1994).
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (1994).
6 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-i to -18a (1994).
7 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 78j(b), 78o(c)(1) (1994), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
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The Securities Act requires that, absent an exemption, an issuer of
securities must file a registration statement with the SEC before its securities
may be offered for sale and forbids securities to be sold until the registration
statement becomes effective.8 Once a registration statement has been filed, the
form and content of prospectuses are closely regulated,9 and, broadly spealdng,
written offers of securities are prospectuses.' 0 The Investment Company Act,
again speaking broadly, forbids an investment company to offer or sell its
securities unless the company is registered under that Act. n' The operative term
"offer" is so broadly defined in both acts that it includes most promotional
activities of investment managers. 12 Thus, if an investment management
arrangement is a security, the registration requirements of the Securities Act
and the Investment Company Act may both require the investment manager to
make extensive filings with the SEC before commencing operations and may
regulate the form and substance of the process by which the investment
manager subsequently offers its services. 13
The disclosure regime of registration is supplemented by substantive
Management activities after funds are invested may also be subject to regulation. See 15
U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1994) (prohibiting transactions by investment advisers).
8 See Securities Act § 5(a), (C), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a), (C) (1994).
9 See Securities Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1994).
10 See Securities Act § 2(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1O) (1994). The Supreme Court created
some uncertainty about the precise meaning of the word "prospectus" in Gustafson v. Alloyd
Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995), in which it held that section 12(2) of the Securities Act, (codified
as amended as 15 U.S.C.A. § 771(a)(2) (1996 Supp.)), does not apply to privately negotiated
secondary transactions.
I ISee Investment Company Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7 (1994).
12 See Securities Act § 2(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1994); Investment Company Act
§ 2(34), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(34) (1994).
13 Various exemptions from Securities Act and Investment Company Act registration
may be available in some cases, but many investment management arrangements would not
qualify for those exemptions. Each of those exemptions contains restrictions, including
restrictions on advertising and sales to small or unsophisticated investors. See generally
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SEcumrIms REGULATION §§ 4.1-.29, 17.1, 17.3 (3d ed.
1995); 2 Louis Loss & Jon- SELGMAN, SECuRrmES REGULATION 1211-60, 1274-1454 (3d
ed. 1989). More important, exemptions cannot be combined, so all transactions in an offering
or issue of securities must satisfy a single exemption; if one does not, none does. See Cheryl
L. Wade, The Integration of Securities Offerings: A Proposed Formua that Fosters the
Policies of Securities Regulation, 25 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 199, 199 (1994); C. Securities Act
Rules §§ 504(b)(2), 505(b)(2)(1), 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504(b)(2), .505(b)(2)(1) (1995) (providing
dollar amounts for Regulation D offerings). It is difficult to predict whether transactions will
be integrated and treated as a single offering, and the prospect of apparently separate accounts
being integrated makes it difficult to rely upon these exemptions to sell investment
management services.
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regulation of those in the securities business. The SEC and the National
Association of Securities Dealers regulate securities brokers and dealers, and
their regulations govern the details of broker-dealer operations. 14 Those who
advise others as to the advisability of investing in securities for compensation
are also subject to the Investment Advisers Act.15 This act requires registration
and periodic reporting, and also regulates investment adviser compensation. 16
Finally, the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws independently
control the form and substance of information that investment managers make
available to prospective clients. 17 Moreover, while investment managers may
not technically be in a fiduciary relationship with prospective clients before they
assume office, the securities laws impose something very much akin to
fiduciary responsibility even during the promotional phase of an investment
management relationship.18
B. The Context in Which the Securities Laws Have Been Applied to
Investment Management Arrangements
Much of the law that determines whether investment management
arrangements are securities was made in the early 1970s. That law developed
largely in response to practices in two businesses that are themselves subject to
extensive federal regulatory schemes: commodities trading and commercial
banking. Since the early 1970s, commodities law and banking law have
changed to address the problems posed by those practices directly, but the legal
doctrines developed in the early 1970s still largely control the question of
whether any investment management arrangement is a security for the purposes
of the federal securities laws.
The first development that led to an expansion of the definition of the word
security in the early 1970s was that nonagricultural commodities began to be
widely traded on commodity exchanges, at a time when such commodities were
14 See Exchange Act §§ 15, 15A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o, 78o-3 (1994). See generally DAvID
A. LiPTON, BROKER-DEALER REGULATION (1995); JERRY W. MARKHAM & THOMAs LEE
HAzEN, BROKER-DEALER OPERATIONS UNDER SECURITIES AND COMMODImEs LAW (1995);
Alexander C. Dill, Broker-Dealer Regulation Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The
Case of Independent Contracting, 1994 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 189, 208-28.
15 See Investment Advisers Act § 202(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2 (1994) (providing the
definition of investment adviser).
16 See generally TAMAR FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS (1978);
HAzEN, supra note 13, ch. 18.
17 See HAZE, supra note 13, § 1.2.
18 See generally NORMAN S. POsER, BROKER-DEALE LAw AND REGULATION ch. 3
(1995) (discussing broker-dealer fraud under the federal securities laws).
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largely unregulated under the commodities laws.19 To obtain a remedy in
federal court, commodity investors who felt they had been wronged argued that
their commodity trading accounts were securities, and many federal courts
agreed. 20 Since then, the commodities laws have been repeatedly amended to
police fraud in commodities dealing directly.21 Even if the remedies that
commodity investors have been extended over the last twenty years are less
generous than those available to security investors, it is unlikely that courts
would have extended the scope of the federal securities laws as much as they
did in the early 1970s if the remedies now available under commodities law had
been available then.22 Nonetheless, the expansive scope that some courts gave
to the securities laws still stands, and it provides the framework for determining
whether any investment management arrangement is a security today.
The other important development that transformed the scope of the federal
securities laws in the early 1970s was that commercial banks tried to offer
investment management services to individuals in a manner that would have
competed with-and to a substantial extent substituted for-mutual funds.23
The mutual funds responded by arguing that these services were securities that
the banking laws forbade commercial banks to offer.24 The SEC responded by
insisting that the arrangements were securities that had to be registered under
the federal securities laws.25 The banking-law argument met with mixed
19 See 1 Pn p MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COMMODimES REGULATION
§ 1.79 (2d ed. 1989).
20 See 2 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 13, at 928-30; see also cases cited infra notes
58-76.
21 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 9a, 13, 13a, 13a-1, 13a-2, 13b, 18 (1994); see also Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982) (finding private right of
action implicit under Commodities Exchange Act); JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 19,
§§ 1.83-.84, 4.145-.190.
2 2 The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463,
(88 Stat. 1389, 1974) ("CFTCA"), substantially reduced SEC jurisdiction over commodities
transactions, giving the Commodity Futures Trading Commission "exclusive
jurisdiction... with respect to accounts, agreements... and transactions involving contracts
of sale of a commodity for future delivery .... " 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (1994). Although
courts continue to hold that managed commodities accounts may be securities, some
commentators read the CFTCA to have established that commodities accounts are not
securities. See 2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 19, § 4.41, at 282-83; cf 2 Loss &
SELGMAN, supra note 13, at 1072-80 (discussing treatment of commodity accounts).23 See ira parts I.C and lJf.
24 See Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The
Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 672 (1987);
see also infra Part ll.C.
25 See infra Part III.
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success,26 but the banks largely went along with the SEC and either altered
their programs2 7 or registered them under the Securities Act and the Investment
Company Act.28 This compliance effort has no doubt been expensive for the
banks, but it has implications far beyond banking. The SEC's theory of why
investment management arrangements may be securities was not limited to
arrangements offered by banks, and the position to which the banks acquiesced,
like the law that courts developed to deal with commodities fraud, continues to
stand as a test of whether any investment management arrangement is a
security.
Scholars have offered the law's response to the growth of investment
management activities as a paradigm of legal evolution and the problem of
statutory obsolescence.29 The issues raised by public trading of nonagricultural
commodities and commercial-bank investment management activities were
eventually addressed as commodities law and banking law questions.
Unfortunately, the initial attempt to resolve those issues by expanding the
definition of the term security created a new set of problems for the field of
investment management. The expanded definition still governs the treatment of
a wide variety of investment management arrangements under the securities
laws, although these arrangements are often structured in apparent disregard of
the possibility that they are securities. Moreover, disagreements about the
meaning of the word security were never resolved, perhaps because the
commodities and banking problems were eventually addressed elsewhere.
Thus, the meaning of the word security, especially as it applies to investment
management arrangements, remains unclear, and it is often difficult to
determine whether a particular investment management arrangement is subject
to the federal securities laws.
HI. INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS AS SECURITIES
When an investment management arrangement is packaged as a
conventional security, such as a share of common stock, the federal securities
laws are clearly implicated in the marketing of the arrangement. Shares in an
open-end investment company-popularly called a mutual fund-are an
example. 30 Such shares are subject to the registration requirements of the
Securities Act; the investment company is subject to the Investment Company
Act; the manager of the company is subject to the Investment Advisers Act;
26 See Langevoort, supra note 24; Willis, supra note 1; see also infra Part Il.C.
27 See infra text accompanying notes 30-34.
28 See infra note 164.
2 9 See Clark, supra note 1; Langevoort, supra note 24.
30 See infra note 151.
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brokers and dealers selling the shares are subject to the Exchange Act; and the
antifraud provisions of the several federal securities statutes govern distribution
of the shares. 31 Those involved in the marketing and management of mutual
funds presumably comply with the pervasive regulatory regime in which they
operate, and they are at least on fair notice of its existence. Other investment
management arrangements may also be securities; however, as the case law
shows, investment managers often fail to take account of that possibility.
The Supreme Court frequently characterizes the federal securities statutes
as remedial statutes that are to be broadly construed in determining whether an
investment vehicle is a security.32 So commissioned, federal courts and the
SEC have read the definition of security in the several federal securities statutes
to include various arrangements between investment managers and their
clients, 33 and the Court itself has held some investment management
arrangements to be statutory securities.34 Nevertheless, the reach of the federal
securities laws has ebbed and flowed over time, and the meaning of the term
security is still open in many of its particulars. However, while the route to
classification of investment management arrangements as securities is not
always clearly marked, it has been traveled enough to leave its broad contours
familiar.
The Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and the Investment Company Act all
define the word security by listing various instruments that are securities, and
each list includes the term "investment contract. " 35 The Supreme Court
31 See supra notes 10-16.
32 See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); see also Reves v. Ernst
& Young, 494 U.S. 56, 60-61 (1990); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). But
see Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982).
33 State courts have followed suit. See, e.g., New York v. First Meridian Planning
Corp., 86 N.Y.2d 608 (1995) (resulting in criminal conviction).
34 See SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967) (holding prematurity
phase of flexible fund annuities are securities); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359
U.S. 65 (1959) (holding variable annuities are securities); see also Howey, 328 U.S. at 293;
c' Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) (holding that interest in collective
investment fund is a security for purposes of Glass-Steagall Act).
35 Securities Act § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2)(1) (1994); Exchange Act § 3(a)(10), 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)(1994); Investment Company Act § 2(a)(36), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(a)(36)(1994); see also Investment Advisers Act § 202(18), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(18) (1994)
(similar definition). The courts have held that the word security generally means the same
thing in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551,
555 n.3 (1982); United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975);
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36, 342 (1967); see also Reves v. Ernst & Young,
494 U.S. 56, 60 n.1 (1990) ("We have consistently held that 'the definition of a security in
§ 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act... is virtually identical [to the definition in the Securities Act]
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elaborated the meaning of that term in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,36 in which it
said that "an investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a
common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party." 37
The meaning of the term investment contract has been much litigated since
Howey. It is by no means settled now, and the elements of the Court's test have
acquired substantial gloss. 38 Nonetheless, the Court defined the term broadly
and, for present purposes, the coverage of the two Acts may be considered the same.' We
reaffirm that principle here.") (quoting Forman).
The word security has even broader duty in the Investment Company Act than in the
other federal securities statutes, and regulated parties sometimes have an incentive to claim
that investments are securities. See, e.g., Putnam Diversified Premium Income Trust, SEC
No-Action Letter, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,325 (July 10,
1989). The relationship between the definitions in the Investment Company Act and the other
federal securities statutes is accordingly somewhat complicated. However, the test of
investment contract under the Exchange Act is often cited as the test under the Investment
Company Act. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 333, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1995), reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat. 682) 619, 621; Investment Co. Act Release No. 11,016,
[1989-1990 Transfer Binder] 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) j 47,374, at 36,378 (Jan. 10,
1980); see also FRANKEL, supra note 16, § F21, at 277. Any investment vehicle that is a
security for purposes of the Securities Act or the Exchange Act is a security for purposes of
the Investment Company Act. See SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, 593 F. Supp. 335, 340
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that if an investment is a security for purposes of the Securities
Act, it is also a security under the Investment Company Act), rev'd on other grounds, 751
F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1984); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1077-78 (7th Cir.
1972) (holding that the definition of security in Investment Company Act is relevant in
interpreting definition in Exchange Act). The question is whether investment vehicles may be
securities for purposes of the Investment Company Act even if they are not securities for
purposes of the other federal securities statutes. See Ptdnam Diversified, [1989-1990 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 79,325, at 79,209-10.
36 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
37 Id. at 298-99.
38 Many commentators have criticized the resulting complexity and uncertainty. See,
e.g., HAZEN, supra note 13, § 1.5, at 31-33; 2 Loss & SEuGMAN, supra note 13, at 870-71;
Thomas Arnold, "When Is a Car a Bicycle?" and Other Riddles: The Definition of a Security
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 449 (1984); William J. Carney,
Defining a Security: The Addition of a Market-Oriented Contestual Approach to Investment
Contract Analysis, 33 EMORY L.J. 311 (1984); Williamson B.C. Chang, Meaning, Reference
and Reification in the Definition of a Security, 19 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 403 (1986); Ronald
Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful Fomuda?, 18
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 367 (1967); Dennis S. Corgill, Securities as Investments at Risk, 67
TUL. L. REV. 861 (1992); Scott FitzGibbon, What Is a Security? - A Redefinition Based on
Eligibility to Participate in the Financial Markets, 64 MINN. L. REv. 893 (1980); James D.
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and further emphasized that its definition "embodies a flexible rather than a
static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and
variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of money of others on the
promise of profits." 39 Moreover, federal courts faced with a perceived wrong
may stretch to hold an investment to be a security in order to provide a federal
remedy. In any event, many investment management arrangements have been
held to be securities. Such arrangements take many forms, however, and it may
be difficult to predict whether a court will characterize a particular arrangement
as a security, especially given the disarray about what an investment contract is.
Judicial inquiry into whether a particular investment management
relationship is a security usually focuses on one or more of the sometimes
intertwined elements of Howey's definition of an investment contract, although,
in practice, examination of the interaction of the various attributes of an
investment vehicle may offer a better prediction of its ultimate characterization
than a checklist approach.40 In any event, in disputes over whether investment
management arrangements are investment contracts, and thus securities, three
questions recur: (1) Is there a common enterprise?; (2) is the investor relying on
the manager to produce profits?; and (3) does the use of a trust change the
analysis?
A. Common Enterprise
The requirement that an investment contract be a common enterprise is
probably the most unsettled element of the Howey test.41 Although some
Gordon III, Common Enterprise and Multiple Investors: A Contractual Theory for Defining
Invesanent Contracts and Notes, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 635; Lewis D. Lowenfels &
Alan R. Bromberg, What Is a Security Under the Federal Security Laws?, 56 ALB. L. REv.
473 (1993); Park McGinty, What Is a Secrity?, 1993 WIs. L. REV. 1033; Randall Quinn &
Paul Gonson, Development of the Securities Law in the Supreme Cour: The Definition of
"Security" and the Implication of Puivate Rights ofAction, 35 How. L.J. 319 (1992); Marc I.
Steinberg & W'flliam E. Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the Definition of "Security": The
"Conte-t" Clause, -Investment Contract" Analysis, and Their Ramifications, 40 VAND. L.
REV. 489 (1987); Maura K. Monaghan, Note, An Uncommon State of Confusion: The
Common Enterprise Element of Investment Contract Analysis, 63 FoRD. L. REv. 2135
(1995).
39 Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
40 See HAzEN, supra note 13, § 1.5, at 31, 34; see also James D. Gordon III,
Interplanetary Intelligence About Promissory Notes as Securities, 69 Tx. L. REv. 383
(1990).
41 See HAZEN, supra note 13, § 1.5, at 34-35; Gordon, supra note 38; Monaghan,
supra note 38; F.S. Tinio, Annotation, What Is an "Investment Contract" Within the Meaning
of § 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, Defining the Term 'Security" as Including an
1997]
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apparently discordant cases can be reconciled on their facts, the case law on
common enterprise leaves investors and managers with little clear guidance on
the scope of the federal securities laws. Some courts have essentially eliminated
the requirement of common enterprise as a meaningful limitation on the scope
of investment contract, and some commentators would eliminate it explicitly.
Much of the difficulty has arisen in cases presenting the question whether
discretionary brokerage accounts constitute a common enterprise, 42 but the
various tests developed in the lower courts show little sensitivity to the way
such accounts operate.
The Supreme Court said little about the common-enterprise element in
Howey. In that case, a corporation that owned citrus groves in Florida offered
to sell investors fee simple interests in the land of a grove,43 and an affiliated
corporation offered to enter into service contracts for the management of the
investors' trees and crops. 44 The Court held that this constituted the offering of
securities, even though investors were free to buy the land without entering into
a service agreement with the promoters. 45 The Court discussed the relevance of
a common enterprise only in the course of explaining why the investments
being offered were "something more than fee simple interests in land,
something different from a farm or orchard coupled with management
services. "46 The difference, according to the Court, was in the fact that
individual development of the plots of land that are offered and sold would
seldom be economically feasible due to their small size. Such tracts gain utility
as citrus groves only when cultivated and developed as component parts of a
larger area. A common enterprise managed by respondents or third parties
with adequate personnel and equipment is therefore essential if the investors are
to achieve their paramount aim of a return on their investments. 47
The presence of a common enterprise may distinguish investment contracts
that are securities from fruit orchards that are not, but courts called upon to
classify investment management arrangements have found little guidance in
Howey. Lower courts have developed three tests of commonality, which are-
at least on their express terms-largely irreconcilable. 48
Investment Contract, 3 A.L.R. FED. 592 (1970).
42 See HAE, supra note 13, § 1.5, at 53-56; 2 Loss & SEuGMAN, supra note 13, at
927-35; Gordon, supra note 38, at 635-42; Monaghan, supra note 38, at 2152-71.
43 See Howey, 328 U.S. at 295.
44 See id.
45 See id at 300.
46 Id. at 299.
47 Id. at 300.
48 In 1985, three justices dissented from the denial of certiorari in Mordaunt v. Ineomco,
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1. Horizontal Commonality
Setting a high threshold for the common-enterprise requirement would
exclude most investment management arrangements from classification as
investment contracts, at least absent pooling of managed assets and collective
management. 49 For a while, the SEC and the courts seemed intent on doing just
that.50 For example, in Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc.,51 Judge (later
Justice) Stevens of the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument that a
discretionary account for trading in commodity futures was a common
enterprise and hence a security.52 Although the plaintiffs alleged that the broker
had entered into similar arrangements with other customers, that was not
enough to make the plaintiffs' account a security.53 The investors in the several
accounts "were not joint participants in the same investment enterprise," 54 and
because the plaintiffs' profits were not dependent upon those of other
customers, the accounts were not securities.55
The Third and Seventh Circuits have joined the Sixth Circuit in adopting
this most restrictive test of the common-enterprise requirement of Howey, the
requirement of horizontal commonality among various investors. 56 Under this
686 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1115 (1985), which held that a
discretionary commodity account was not a security. They argued that certiorari should have
been granted "[iln light of the clear and significant split in the Circuits." 469 U.S. at 1117.
This dissent contains a tight description of the various tests the circuits have developed, which
are discussed below.
49 A pooled investment vehicle is one in which all contributions of investors are treated
as part of the same unit and the interests of investors are represented by participations in that
unit. Common examples of pooled investment vehicles are commingled trust funds and
investment companies.50 Despite the well-known existence of discretionary management services, the SEC has
apparently never acted, either through enforcement or through its rulemaking authority, to
have individual discretionary accounts registered as securities absent a common investment
management scheme. For example, in 1970, the SEC attacked a managed account
arrangement as a security on the ground, among others, that investment decisions were being
implemented in all accounts on a uniform basis, but not simply on the ground that the
accounts were being managed on a discretionary basis. See SEC v. First Nat'l City Bank,
SEC Litigation Release No. 4534, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
92,592 (Feb. 6, 1970); see also infra text accompanying note 211 (discussing Release No.
4534).
51457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1972).
52 See id. at 279.
53 See id.
54 Id. at 277.
55 Id. at 276-77.
56 See Wals v. Fox Hills Dev. Corp., 24 F.3d 1016, 1017 (7th Cir. 1994); Deckebach
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approach, which has been held to require that several investors' funds be
pooled, 57 conventional discretionary accounts, in which a manager makes
investment decisions for a particular investor's account, are not securities, and
even more exotic arrangements can be structured to avoid their being classified
as securities.
2. Broad Vertical Commonality
Notwithstanding Milnarik and similar cases, there were indications even
before Howey that a managed investment account, at least one over which the
manager had discretionary authority, may be an investment contract. 58 Another
v. La Vida Charters, Inc., 867 F.2d 278, 283 (6th Cir. 1989); Hart v. Pulte Homes of Mich.
Corp., 735 F.2d 1001, 1003 (6th Cir. 1984); Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 682 F.2d 459, 460 (3d Cir. 1982); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 219 (6th Cir. 1980), a'd, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
5 7 See Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 277-78 (7th Cir. 1972); see
also Wals, 24 F.3d at 1017; Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 99 (7th Cir.
1977); Meredith v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCII) 97,701, at 98,672 (D.D.C. 1980); Darrell v. Goodson, [1979-1980 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 97,349 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Wasnowic v. Chicago Bd. of
Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066, 1067 (D. Md. 1972), aftd, 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1973); cf.
Curran, 622 F.2d at 219 (holding commodities account was not a security even though broker
falsely represented it would be pooled), af'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982). But cf
SEC v. Lauer, 52 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that an investment in a fraudulent
scheme that was supposed to involve pooling but only succeeded in attracting one investor
was a security: "[lit is the character of the investment vehicle, not the presence of multiple
investors, that determines whether there is an investment contract.").
5 8 Thus, in 1935 one court wrote that
Whether one invests money in the proverbial gold mine . . . or invests in a
speculative venture by reason of the claimed skill and experience of a grain and stock
market manipulator to make profits, the transactions cannot be rationally distinguished in
determining the dealings which Congress intended to regulate in using the term
"investment contract." Both are investments .... Both entail the issuance of a security.
In one the investor expects profits by reason of the gold to be mined; in the other, by
reason of the skill and experience of the defendant in the market. In both, the
opportunities for fraud are notorious.
SEC v. Wickham, 12 F. Supp. 245, 248-249 (D. Minn. 1935). After the Supreme Court
decided Howey, a number of cases came to the same conclusion. See, e.g., Marshall v.
Lamson Bros. & Co., 368 F. Supp. 486, 490 (S.D. Iowa 1974); Johnson v. Arthur, Espey,
Shearson, Hammill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Berman v. Orimex
Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701, 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Maheu v. Reynolds & Co., 282 F.
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approach to common enterprise-under which managed accounts are more
likely to be classified as securities-requires not horizontal commonality among
investors but instead vertical commonality between the investors and the
manager or promoter. Most federal courts are satisfied that the common-
enterprise requirement of the Howey test is satisfied by the presence of
horizontal commonality in the form of pooled accounts, 59 but some courts have
held that one or another form of vertical commonality is sufficient even in the
absence of horizontal commonality. 6° Adding to the confusion, however, the
courts that are satisfied with vertical commonality do not agree on what
constitutes vertical commonality. 61
The SEC emphasized the commonality of discretionary management
services offered to various customers in its early forays against managed
accounts. 62 Subsequently, however, the SEC and some courts began to take the
position that the reliance an individual investor places in a manager's acumen
can itself form the basis of a common enterprise sufficient to satisfy Howey.
Under the broader test of vertical commonality, it is enough that the investor's
success is dependent on the efforts of the manager.
The most influential statement of this approach is probably the Fifth
Circuit's 1974 opinion in SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp.,63 a case in
which the SEC sought to enjoin a firn dealing in commodities futures from
violating the registration provisions of the Securities Act and the antifraud
provisions of the Exchange Act.64 Following Milnarik, the district court
Supp. 423, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); cf Commercial Iron & Metal Co. v. Bache & Co., 478
F.2d 39, 42-43 (10th Cir. 1973); Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Servs., 430 F.2d 132,
134 (8th Cir. 1970). See generally HAZEN, supra note 13, § 1.5, at 47-50 (citing cases); 2
Loss & SEuGMAN, supra note 13, at 931 n.138 ("Several older cases, often with little
analysis, simply assumed that a discretionary commodities account involved a security.").
59 See SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also HAZEN,
supra note 13, § 1.5, at 33.
60 See HAZEN, supra note 13, § 1.5, at 33.
61 See id.
62 See SEC, Report of the Advisory Committee on Investment Management Services for
Individual Investors, Small Account Investment Management Services, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCII) No. 465, Pt. Il (1973) [hereinafter Advisory Committee Report]; SEC Litigation
Release No. 4534, supra note 211; see also infra text accompanying note (discussing Release
No. 4534); cf. Status of Investment Advisory Programs Under the Investment Company Act
of 1940, Investment Company Act Release No. 21,260, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 85,646 (July 27, 1995).
63 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
64 The court of appeals described the Continental Commodities' operations as follows:
The trading enterprise extended the opportunity to invest in commodities futures
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dismissed the complaint, on the theory that since the accounts of individual
investors were unrelated, no security was involved. 65 The SEC appealed, but
only on the theory that notes the firm had issued to its customers were
securities.66 The court of appeals, however, examined the question of whether
the investors were participating in a common enterprise, even though the issue
was not contested by the parties. 67 The court concluded that they were, and
accordingly found that the investors' arrangements with Continental were
securities. 68
The Fifth Circuit grounded its rejection of Milnarik on its decision in SEC
v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,69 which it had rendered a few days before.
Koscot held that a multi-level distributorship scheme was an investment
contract, and hence a security, even though investors in the distributorship had
to contribute their own efforts to accomplish their own success and realized a
return that was largely independent of the return to other investors. 70 According
to Continental Commodities, the "critical inquiry" in deciding whether a
common enterprise is involved
is confined to whether the fortuity of the investments collectively is essentially
dependent upon promoter expertise. Continental Commodities renders
investment counseling concerning which option on commodities futures to
invest in, when to sell or exercise the option, and if the option is exercised,
when to sell the specific futures contract. Lacking the business acumen
possessed by promoters, investors inexorably rely on Continental
contracts. Continental Commodities undertook to recommend certain commodities
futures contracts to its customers. An interested customer would first be issued an
option, guaranteeing him the right to purchase the contract at a stated price, with the
option to remain open for a specified period of time. Continental Commodities neither
owned the underlying futures contract nor escrowed any portion of the customer
payments for the purpose of acquiring such contracts. In addition, Continental
Commodities undertook to advise a customer of the most opportune moment either to
sell or to exercise the option. Finally, it also offered investment counseling as to the most
propitious time to sell a specific futures contract.
Id. at 519.
65 Seeid. at 521.
66 See id. at 520.
67 See id. at 521-23.
68 See id. at 527.
69 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
70 The primary issue in Koscot was whether the Howey requirement of an expectation of
profits "solely from the efforts of others" was satisfied inasmuch as investors in the
distributorship had to contribute their own efforts after investing money. The court held that
the Howey test was satisfied. See id. at 479-85.
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Commodities' guidance for the success of their investment. This
guidance... is uniformly extended to all... investors. That it may bear
more productive fruits in the case of some options than it does in cases of
others should not vitiate the essential fact that the success of the trading
enterprise as a whole and customer investments individually is contingent upon
the sagacious investment counseling of Continental Commodities. 71
The court's emphasis on the investors' reliance on the defendants' expertise
suggests that a broker arranging a single managed account with a single
customer may be selling a security, since a single investor can rely on a
manager in the same way that many investors can.72 On the other hand, the
defendants in Continental Commodities offered management services to many
customers, 73 and the action was initiated by the SEC, not by a customer seeking
damages. 74 Moreover, the court's repeated references to "the trading
enterprise" might be read to contemplate that a manager's activities can
constitute a common enterprise only when they involve several accounts or at
least several investors. 75 Nonetheless, several courts have held that a single
customer's managed brokerage account is a security. 76
71 Coninenta! Commodities, 497 F.2d at 522-23.
72 See 2 Loss & SEuGMAN, supra note 13, at 933.
73 See Conntalta! Commodities, 497 F.2d at 519.
74 See id. at 518.
75 See Gordon, supra note 38 (arguing that Howey's common-enterprise requirement
should be interpreted to require multiple parallel investors); cf SEC v. Lauer, 52 F.3d 667
(7th Cir. 1995) (holding that an investment in a fraudulent scheme in which the promoter
represented there would be pooling was a security even though the scheme attracted only one
investor).
76 See, e.g., Alvord v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 848, 852 (D. Conn.
1980) (holding that a "de facto" discretionary account is a security); Troyer v. Karcagi, 476
F. Supp. 1142, 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Scheer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCHI) 95,086 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(holding commodity futures account to be a security where defendant asserted experience and
expertise, and emphasized prospects of a good rate of return to customer who, in fact, always
relied upon and followed defendant's advice); Rochkind v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 388 F. Supp.
254, 255 (D. Md. 1975) (holding commodity futures account to be a security, even absent a
"pooling" of funds of several investors, where customer relied solely on broker's expertise in
allowing broker to make investment decisions for him); Johnson v. Arthur, Espey, Shearson,
Hammill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Berman v. Orimex Trading Co., 291
F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Maheu v. Reynolds & Co., 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); see also Moody v. Bache & Co., 570 F.2d 523, 526 (5th Cir. 1978) (suggesting that
individual discretionary commodities account may be a security, but denying recovery);
HAzEN, supra note 13, § 1.5, at 47-50. But see Darrell v. Goodson, [1979-1980 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,349, at 97,323 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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3. Narrow Vertical Commonality
Continental Commodities and its progeny have been widely criticized by
courts 77 and commentators. 78 The Ninth Circuit has developed a narrower test
of vertical commonality, requiring "that the fortunes of the investors are linked
with those of the promoters. " 79 Under this test, it is not enough that the
investors are dependent upon the efforts of the manager; the success of the
manager and investor must be interdependent. Thus, a discretionary account is
not a security if the brokerage firm is compensated only by commissions, since
the firm profits even if the client does not.80 On the other hand, Howey's
common-enterprise requirement is satisfied under this test if the manager
receives a fee or bonus that is a function of the investor's profits, because the
manager's own profit is then "contingent on the profit of his investors." 81
77 See Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 1994); Curran v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 233 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd on other
grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Gaudette v. Panos, 644 F. Supp. 826, 834 (D. Mass. 1986),
complaint dismissed, 650 F. Supp. 912 (D. Mass. 1987), complaint ordered reinstated, 852
F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1988); Mechigian v. Art Capital Corp., 612 F. Supp. 1421, 1426
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Sennett v. Oppenheimer & Co., 502 F. Supp. 939, 945 (N.D. M. 1980).
78 See, e.g., 2 Loss & SEuGmAN, supra note 13, at 933 ("Unless two or more persons
in some sense share in the profitability of an undertaking, it is difficult to argue that there is a
common enterprise."); Gordon, supra note 38, at 664-66; Monaghan, supra note 38, at
2161-62.
79 SEC v. R.G. Reynolds Enters., Inc., 952 F.2d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting
SEC v. Goldfield Deep Mines, 758 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also Goldfield Deep
Mines, 758 F.2d at 463 ("A common enterprise is a venture 'in which the "fortunes of the
investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success of those seeking the
investment or of third parties.""') (quoting Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 460 (9th
Cir. 1978), quoting in tam SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7
(9th Cir. 1973).
80 See Brodt, 595 F.2d at 459; Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 638 F. Supp. 4, 7
(D. Mass. 1985), aft'd, 793 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1986); Shotto v. Laub, 635 F. Supp. 835, 839
(D. Md. 1986); see also HAzEN, supra note 13, § 1.5, at 33 n.45.
81 R.G. Reynolds Enters., 952 F.2d at 1131; see also Goldfeld Deep Mines, 758 F.2d at
463 ("Here, the investors' fortunes were clearly linked with those of appellants. The ore
program required the sharing of profits, in that Goldfield [(the promoter)] was to receive a
25% royalty fee for processing the investors' ore. Furthermore, the fortunes of both the
investors and appellants were dependent upon the success of appellants' unique ore processing
technique. If the processing technique were to prove faulty, then both the investors and
appellants would suffer financial losses. This direct correlation between Goldfield's potential
failure and the investors' losses supports a finding of a common enterprise."); Savino v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 507 F. Supp. 1225, 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding security where broker was
to receive a percentage of investor's profits).
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4. Individual Treatment and Common Enterprise
While different courts have described the test of common enterprise in
widely different terms and have applied very different tests in some cases,
opinions that are expressed in irreconcilable terms often reach entirely
consistent results. Moreover, the factors that courts have cited to explain
themselves in the end draw distinctions that have little to do with the substance
of managed accounts.
Although investment management relationships take many forms, courts
have not always focused on the nuances of the arrangements before them. For
example, the accounts at issue in Continental Commodities-the broadest
common-enterprise case-were hardly typical brokerage accounts. Usually an
investor with a brokerage account owns the assets purchased for the account,
and the risk of loss is for all practical purposes solely a function of the wisdom
of the investment decision. In Continental Commodities, on the other hand, the
investors looked to their manager for more than advisory services. Continental
placed its clients into naked options written by the firm,82 and the litigation
grew out of its inability to make good the investors' claims against the firm.83
Accordingly, the investors faced not only the risk that the firm's advice was
poor, but also the substantial risk that the firm would be unable to pay their
claims even if their investments proved successful. Thus, the decision of the
court-if not the language of its opinion-may have turned on the
interdependence of the investors and their manager. In light of the investors'
reliance on their manager's economic viability, Continental Commodities might
not have been quite the startling decision that it appeared to be.
82 See Sec v. Continental Commodities, 497 F.2d 516, 518 (5th Cir. 1974). The SEC
has repeatedly indicated that an investor's retention of the indicia of ownership of underlying
investments is critical if an investment management arrangement is not to be treated as a
security. See Investment Company Act Release No. 21,260, supra note 62, at 86,968,
86,973; Benson White & Co., 1995 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 553, at *6 (June 14, 1995); Wall
Street Preferred Money Managers, Inc., 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 648, at *2 (Apr. 10,
1992); West America Co., 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1321, at *1 (Nov. 26, 1991); Morgan
Keegan & Co., 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1168, at *1 (Oct. 2, 1990); International Asset
Management, Inc., 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 294, at *2 (Jan. 29, 1990).
83 In essence, the agreements between client and manager were the equivalent of
evidences of indebtedness, another type of security under the federal securities laws. See SEC
v. Western Pacific Gold & Silver Exch. Corp., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 95,064 (D. Nev. 1975) (holding that sales agreements for client investments in
gold coins and silver bars constituted "evidences of indebtedness" where clients did not
acquire title to the gold or silver, but did acquire claims for money against the defendant, and
where clients' moneys were subjected to the "risks of the enterprise"); see also 2 Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 900-02.
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The SEC has at times suggested that commonality derives from the mutual
interest of investors in the financial health of their manager. For example, in a
complaint against the Pacific Coast Coin Exchange (PCCE),84 the SEC alleged
that PCCE sold its clients silver coins and other commodities on margin without
purchasing or holding the coins or commodities until the margin accounts were
paid in fll.85 Instead, according to the SEC, PCCE commingled investor funds
and subjected them to the risk of the PCCE venture.86 In effect, investors
became creditors of the firm, an arrangement that might well have been
classifiable as the issuance of a security in any event, on the theory that the
underlying investment arrangements were evidences of indebtedness. 87 Investor
reliance on the manager's viability was thus arguably the key to the SEC's
thinking on common enterprise. 88 Nonetheless, courts that have followed
Continental Commodities have ignored the investors' dependence on the
continued success of their manager in that case.89
In any event, the argument that Continental Commodities turned on the
investors' reliance on the firm's viability would run into the Fifth Circuit's
stated rationale. Although the court apparently understood that the investors'
accounts represented investments in both commodities options and the financial
health of the firm, it did not emphasize common investment in the firm as a
84 SEC v. MONEX Int'l Ltd., SEC Litigation Release No. 6645, 1974 SEC LEXIS
2114 (Dec. 18, 1974) (SEC alleged that a security existed where customers' funds were
commingled in defendant's coin-investment enterprise, managed by defendant, subjected to
the risks of that enterprise, and where investors relied on defendant's efforts for the safe
return of their investments); see also SEC v. MONEX Int'l Ltd., SEC Litigation Release No.
7057, 1975 SEC LEXIS 959 (Aug. 25, 1975) (announcing that a permanent injunction had
been granted against the defendants).
8 5 See MONEX; 1974 SEC LEXIS at *2.
86 See id.
87 See Western Pacific Gold & Silver EXch. Corp., Fed. See. L. Rep. [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] (CCH) 95,064. The court in Jenson v. Continental Finance Corp., 404 F.
Supp. 792 (D. Minn. 1975), also concluded that contracts to purchase gold and silver coins
were investment contracts. The opinion places substantially more weight than do Continental
Commodities and MONEX on the degree to which the investors were coventurers with the
firm.
88 See also Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, 756 F.2d 230, 240 (2d Cir.
1985) ("The customers [of Merrill Lynch's program of marketing bank certificates of deposit]
rely on the skill and financial stability of Merrill Lynch....").
89 Te Fifth Circuit followed and reaffirmed Continental Commodities in Long v. Shultz
Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1989). The court did not suggest that the promoter's
viability was in doubt in Long, and the court again focused on the investors' reliance on the
promoter's expertise. Id. at 140-41.
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basis for concluding that the accounts were securities. 9° Instead, the court
explained its decision by emphasizing that investment success was "essentially
dependent upon promoter expertise," that guidance was "uniformly extended to
all... investors," and that the results of the enterprise as a whole and customer
investments individually were "contingent upon the sagacious investment
counseling of Continental Commodities."91 In sum, the court focused not on
the investors' dependence on the continued viability of the firm, but on the
expert advice the promoter promised to provide.
This expertise interpretation of Continental Commodities finds support in
other cases. 92 In SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distributors, Ltd.,9 3 for example,
the court acknowledged that commonality normally implies participation in a
common fund, but held that "the requisite commonality of enterprise may also
be achieved when 'the fortunes of all investors are inextricably tied to the
efficacy [of the promoters' efforts].'" 94 However, if Howey's common-
enterprise requirement is satisfied whenever an investor's profits are affected by
the competence of an investment manager, it does little to restrict the scope of
the term investment contract. If common enterprise can be shown by the
existence of an interest in managerial ability, security status turns largely on the
provision of managerial assistance.95 Yet the degree of managerial assistance is
90 As noted above, in the court of appeals, the SEC argued only that certain notes issued
by the firm were securities, and the court reached the common-enterprise question on its own
initiative. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
91 Continental Commodities, 497 F.2d at 522-23; see also Gary Plastic Packaging, 756
F.2d at 240.
92 See, e.g., Long, 881 F.2d at 129, 140-41 (reaffirming Continental Commodities test
of common enterprise); see also Gaiy Plastic Packaging, 756 F.2d at 240.
93 388 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
94 Id. at 1291 (quoting SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th Cir.
1974)). Brigadoon Scotch Distributors and similar cases support the idea that an arrangement
or promotion should be regarded as a statutory investment contract whenever an investor
contributes the assets at risk in an investment arrangement and the realization of a return
depends primarily on the efforts of the promoter or manager. See HAzEN, supra note 13,
§ 1.5, at 62; Corgill, supra note 38; J. Thomas Hannan & William E. Thomas, The
Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal Secuities, 25 HAsTNGs L.J.
219 (1974) (emphasizing the importance of the location of the risk of loss and the control of
the return on investment); Joseph C. Long, An Attempt to Return Investment "Contracts" to
the Mainstream of Secuities Regulation, 24 OiLA. L. REV. 135, 174 (1971) (suggesting that
a security should be defined as "the investment of money or money's worth in the risk capital
of a venture with the expectation of some benefit to the investor when the investor has no
direct control over the investment or policy decisions of the venture."); see also Coffey,
supra note 38. The Supreme Court has noted this theory without accepting or rejecting it. See
United Housing Foundation, Inc., v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 857 n.24 (1975).
95 Thus, in Brigadoon Scotch Distributors the court effectively combined the third-party
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precisely the issue raised by the second element of the Howey test: Do profits
come from the efforts of others?96
In the end, however, given the way that accounts are actually managed, the
common-enterprise issue is far less polar than these two explanations of the
Continental Commodities line of cases would suggest. Although opinions
involving managed accounts sometimes proceed on the assumption that
investment accounts under a single manager have little in common except for
the identity of the manager, in fact the investments in managed portfolios
typically overlap. Investment managers seldom mimic individuals by seeking
investment opportunities account by account. Instead, they evaluate investment
opportunities first, and, where action is indicated, identify all accounts suitable
for the action.97 Although not every investment is made for every account, the
correspondence in activity among accounts with similar objectives is typically
high. Correspondence tends to increase over time because investment managers
necessarily follow only a limited selection of investment opportunities rather
than the entire investment universe.98 Thus, even if common management is
critical to common enterprise, sensitive scrutiny of managed accounts will often
reveal it, and the practical realities of investment management that lead to
overlapping portfolios will only reinforce commonality.
reliance and common-enterprise elements of Howey when it cited a variety of management
services, including the initial purchase of rare-coin portfolios and administrative support
thereafter, to establish the existence of commonality. See Brigadoon, 388 F. Supp. at 1291-
92. This approach was compelled by the fact that the only thing all the clients shared was the
defendants' professional services.
96 See infra Part II.B (discussing efforts-of-others requirement). Critics have noted that
the broad doctrine of vertical commonality duplicates the efforts-of-others element of the
Howey test. See, e.g., Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 1994); Gordon,
supra note 38, at 665. The Fifth Circuit has acknowledged this criticism, but indicated that it
will continue to follow Continental Commodities nonetheless. See Long, 881 F.2d at 140-41.
97 See HAR VEY E. BuNEs, THE LAW OF INvEMENT MANAGEm ch. 4 (1978)
(discussing suitability).
98 After the most exhaustive study of managed individual accounts, the SEC's Advisory
Committee on Investment Management Services for Individual Investors pointed out that even
when clients retain authority to reject or act upon any recommendation, many advisers make
blanket recommendations to many of their accounts. While maintaining its position that such
accounts should not be subject to formal registration, in the face of this observed disregard of
individual client needs, the Committee suggested that the SEC require firms servicing
nondiscretionary accounts to describe the basis for all recommendations made to the client in
order to enable the client to exercise independent judgment. Advisory Committee Report,
supra note 62, at 25-26; see also id. at 33-38 (suggesting disclosure guidelines). Advisers
Act Rule 204-3, 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-3 (1995), responds to this concern. See Investment
Advisors Act Release No. 664, 1979 SEC LEXIS 2235 (Jan. 30, 1979); see also BNus,
supra note 97, 9.03[2][b].
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A critical problem that the common-enterprise cases pose for investment
management is that ordinary brokerage accounts ought not to be treated as
securities, even if the registered representative handling the account
recommends investments to the owner. Such accounts have long been common,
and if they were supposed to be treated as securities, surely someone would
have said so when the federal securities statutes were enacted. On the other
hand, some individual brokerage accounts are securities, 99 and the task is to
draw distinctions. Unfortunately, however, the cases simply cannot be
reconciled.
If there is a key to all of this, it may be that investment management
arrangements are securities unless the manager treats each managed account
separately. As the SEC has said in a related context, each account is "managed
on the basis of the client's financial situation, investment objectives, and
instructions. " 100 Using lack of individual treatment as the definition of security
probably explains the cases as well as any other test, although it is not the test
articulated by the courts. Moreover, this definition offers a distinction between
conventional brokerage accounts-in which an investor expects to review and
decide upon specific investments as they are made-and accounts employing a
special trading system or investment approach-in which the most important
decision the investor makes is whether to become involved in the first place.' 01
Although courts have not offered lack of individual treatment as the test of
common enterprise, an individualization test of common enterprise is consistent
with both the language of Howey as well as the policies underlying the
securities laws. 102
When an investment manager handles all of its accounts the same way
regardless of the situations of individual account holders, all the account holders
receive common treatment, and thus a test of investment contract that turns on
the absence of individual treatment for investors squares with the words the
Supreme Court used to define the term in Howey: common enterprise. 103 This
99 See sources cited supra notes 58, 76.
100 Investment Company Act Release No. 21,260, supra note 62, at 86,969; see also
infra Part 111.
101 Cf. Eberhardt v. Waters, 901 F.2d 1578, 1580-81 (11th Cir. 1990) ("The thrust of
the common enterprise test is that the investors have no desire to perform the chores
necessary for a return, and are attracted to the investment solely by the prospects of a
return.").
102 See infra Part Il. The individualization inquiry is like the horizontal approach to
common enterprise in that it asks whether several investors are in the same situation, but
individualization differs in that it does not ask whether those investors share risks or retain
individual ownership of their assets. See supra Part II.A.1.
103 Professors Loss and Seligman endorse the Ninth Circuit's narrow approach to
vertical commonality, in which a security can be found only when profits are shared, whether
19971
OHIO STATE LAWJOURMAL
test also squares with the little that the Supreme Court said about common
enterprise in that case, which was to the effect that a common enterprise is an
enterprise in which the interests of all investors are treated alike. As noted
above, the Court found that the defendants in Howey were offering a common
enterprise precisely because "individual development of the plots of land that
[were] offered and sold would seldom be economically feasible." 104
A test of common enterprise that treats investments as securities unless the
investors receive individualized treatment also furthers the policies underlying
the disclosure requirements of the securities laws. While disclosure is an
appropriate tool for dealing with the issues created by nonindividualized
investment management services, it is not well calculated to address the
problems implicated by the factors to which the other tests of common
enterprise are keyed. The primary consequence of holding that a particular
investment management arrangement is a security is that the manager may have
to describe the arrangement in a registration statement and statutory prospectus
before proposing it to potential investors.10 5 The precise meaning of the term
security in difficult cases might be thought to turn on precisely what ends the
disclosure provisions of the securities laws are supposed to serve.1 6 However,
a security has to be something about which meaningful disclosure can be made
if the disclosure requirement is to make any sense, or if it is to accomplish
anything at all.
If an investment manager proposes to manage accounts according to the
individual needs of each investor as those needs change over time, then there is
little for the manager to disclose to potential investors when the management
relationship is created beyond how the manager will be compensated and how
the managed assets will be safeguarded. On the other hand, if a manager
proposes to treat all managed accounts alike and employ a common technique
for choosing investments, then the registration statement can describe that
technique. This technique is precisely that which prospective investors need to
know before they hire a manager who will not provide them individualized
services. In fact, nonindividualized investment management arrangements are
treated as securities only if investors can be assured of getting adequate
information about management arrangements when they need it.107
between investors or between an investor and a promoter. See 2 Loss & SEuGmAN, spqra
note 13, at 935. This approach does give some meaning to the term common enterprise, but
there is no reason the protections of the federal securities laws ought to attach when (and
whenever) a manager shares in an investor's profits but not otherwise.
104 Howey, 328 U.S. at 300; see also supra text accompanying note 47.
105 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77f, 77j (1994).
106 See, e.g., Corgill, supra note 38; Gordon, supra note 38.
107 See infra Part IV.
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Finally, lack of individual treatment is an appropriate test of common
enterprise as a matter of administrative law. As discussed below, the SEC has
looked to individualization to answer the analogous (and perhaps identical)
question of whether managed accounts are securities for purposes of
determining whether the creator of such accounts is operating an investment
company that must register under the Investment Company Act. 108 The SEC's
administrative construction is entitled to deference, and it also provides a more
coherent body of law than what the courts have provided so far.
In the end, it is hard to fit investment management arrangements into
Howey's common-enterprise element. In Howey, the element served a function
that may not be present in investment management cases. 1°9 The Supreme
Court's task was to distinguish citrus groves that are not securities from
complicated management arrangements that are, and common enterprise
worked to do so.110 The factors that move courts to treat some investment
management arrangements as securities are not always apparent, but whatever
they are, they simply are not captured in any idea of commonality. Recognizing
as much, some formulations of investment-contract doctrine simply abandon the
common-enterprise requirement.111 Whether that is an accurate prediction of
where the law is going as a general matter, it is at least a fair statement of much
of the law governing the status of investment management arrangements.
B. Control Of Investment Decisions
Howey's requirement that profits be expected "solely through the efforts of
the promoter or of some one other than themselves" 112 ties security status to the
control investors retain over their investments. This requirement is illustrated in
cases holding limited partnership interests to be securities and general
partnership interests not to be.113 However, the reliance element of the Howey
108 See infra Part mH.
109 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
110 See SEC v W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299-300 (1946).
111 See HAZEN, supra note 13, § 1.5, at53.112 Howey, 328 U.S. at 298.
113 Compare Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115 (9th Cir. 1992) (plaintiffs failed to
plead allegations sufficient to establish that their general partnership interests were securities)
and Klaers v. St. Peter, 942 F.2d 535 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that particular general
partnership interest was not a security) and Stewart v. Raglan, 934 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1990)
(same) and Banghart v. Hollywood General Partnership, 902 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1990)
(same) and Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that general
partnership interest was not a security because partners all vested with complete managerial
control), aft'd, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977) with Reeves v. Teuscher, 881 F.2d 1495 (9th
Cir. 1989) (holding that limited partnership interests were securities, general partnership
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test has been substantially refined, so that the "solely" requirement does not
preclude all investor participation. It is now sufficient if the "efforts made by
those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential
managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise." 114
Franchising arrangements, for example, may be securities even if the
franchisees are not totally passive. Instead of insisting on abject dependence,
courts focus on the extent to which the promoter or a third party is involved in
the subsequent management of the franchised business. 1" 5 Thus, a franchise is
interest was not) and SEC v. Interlink Data Network, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20163 (C.D.
Cal. 1993) (holding that limited partnership interest was a security) and Sampson v. Invest
America, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 928 (D. Mass. 1990) (holding that limited partnership interests
were securities) and Herman v. Doug Frank Dev. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(holding that limited partnership interest was a security). But see Stone v. Kirk, 8 F.3d 1079
(6th Cir. 1993) (holding that interest in joint venture-general partnership that leased master
recordings was a security); Koch v. Hankins, 928 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that
interest in general partnership may be a security); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th
Cir. 1981) (holding that although there is a strong presumption against characterizing general
partnerships as securities, it is appropriate to do so where the agreement leaves the investor
with little power, where the investor is so inexperienced in business affairs as to be incapable
of exercising power, or where the investor is so dependent on the unique skills of the
promoter as to be incapable of exercising power); K.B.R. Inc. v. L.A. Smoothie Corp., 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15973 (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 1995) (holding that joint venture interest may be
a security). See generally HAzEN, supra note 13, § 1.5, at 50-51 (collecting cases).
114 SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973); see also
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975) ("The touchstone is
the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of
profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others."); SEC v. Life
Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (discussing profits "predominantly" from the
efforts of others); Monaghan, supra note 38, at 2147-48 (collecting cases). See generally
HAZEN, supra note 13, § 1.5, at 31-32; 2 Loss & SEuGMAN, supra note 13, at 941-48.
115 See, e.g., Meyer v. Dam un Jardin, S.A., 816 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding
that boutique franchise was not a security); Villeneuve v. Advanced Bus. Concepts Corp.,
730 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (distributorship for sale of self-watering planters
was not a security); Bitter v. Hoby's Int'l, Inc., 498 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that
restaurant franchise was not a security since franchisees responsible for day-to-day
management and operation of restaurant, despite strict franchise guidelines); Nash & Assocs.,
Inc. v. Lum's of Ohio, Inc., 484 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1973); Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City
Steak, Inc., 460 F.2d 666, 670 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding that restaurant franchise was not a
security); Gotham Print, Inc. v. American Speedy Printing Centers, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 447
(E.D. Mich. 1994) (holding that master franchise for printing stores was not a security); SEC
v. Bull Inv. Group, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) q 95,010
(D. Mass. 1975) (holding that arrangement whereby local "dealers" (franchisees) would
solicit new customers in return for a commission was a security because ultimate success or
failure of the recruitment depended upon franchiser's sales-presentation efforts); L.H.M., Inc.
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not a security if the franchisee will be largely responsible for running it, even if
the franchiser will help start the franchised business. 116 On the other hand,
franchise programs may be securities when the franchiser is largely responsible
for selling to the fianchisee's potential customers.
11 7
Courts have taken a similar approach to investment management services.
For example, the classification of accounts invested in precious metals or rare
coins depends on the extent to which buyers rely on someone else to
accomplish their investment aims. Thus, those who simply sell precious metals
to commercial buyers and investors are not selling securities; 118 nor are coin
dealers who sell their inventory to bona fide numismatists.119 Buyers of
precious metals and coins have been held to have bought securities, however,
when they have relied on the promoters to produce the product or given
substantial weight to their opinions and recommendations about how to
minimize risk while maximizing the chance of appreciation. 120
v. Lewis, 371 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.J. 1974) (holding that theater franchise was not a security
due to participants' "significant contributions" to the management and operation of the
theater), at'd, 510 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1975); Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1262
(N.D. M. 1973) (holding that distributorship franchise was a security where franchisee's role
was purely mechanical and ministerial, devoid of any power to make "meaningful or
independent business decisions"). See generally 2 Loss & SEuGMAN, supra note 13, at 971-
77; Kathy J. Tidd, Is a Franchise Also a Security?, FRANcH. L.J., Winter 1988, at 1.
116 See, e.g., Meyer, 816 F.2d 533; see also A.B.A. Auto Lease Corp. v. Adam Indus.,
Inc., 387 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1975); cf SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (holding that pre-investment assistance was insufficient to satisfy Howey).
117 See, e.g., SEC v. Bull Inv. Group, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 95,010 (D. Mass. 1975); see also SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prod. Corp., 687 F.2d
577 (2d Cir. 1982); Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. M11. 1973);
Huberman v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
118 See, e.g., Mocatta Metals Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,940 (Aug. 1, 1974); see also SEC v. Belmont Reid &
Co., 794 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1986) (gold not yet extracted); Noa v. Key Futures, Inc., 638
F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1980) (silver bars). But see Commonwealth Silver Exch., Inc., 1975 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 1415 (July 9, 1975) (declining to take no-action position where precious
metals would be sold on margin).
119 See Morgan v. Financial Planning Advisors, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 923 (D. Mass.
1988); Steve Ivy Rare Coin Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
80,233 (June 5, 1975); see also SEC v. Belmont Reid & Co., Inc., 794 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir.
1986) (gold not yet extracted).
12 0 See SEC v. R.G. Reynolds Enters., Inc., 952 F.2d 1125, 1127 (9th Cir. 1991)
(finding a gold ore refining venture in which investors depended on promoter's effort to
finance, construct, and operate gold refining plant a security); SEC v. Goldfield Deep Mines,
758 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1985) (similar); SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrbs., Ltd., 388 F.
Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Commonwealth Silver Exch., Inc., 1975 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
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For investment managers, the most important question arising from the
requirement that profits be obtained "solely" through the efforts of others is
whether complete discretionary authority is necessary for a managed account to
acquire security status. Some courts have held that a nondiscretionary account
cannot be a security because an investor who retains ultimate control of her
own account is not "dependent on the managerial efforts of others." 121
Nonetheless, just as courts have relaxed the "solely" requirement in franchising
and pyramid schemes, some have relaxed it in respect of investment
management accounts.
In SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distributors, Ld.,122 which held that the sale
1415 (July 9, 1975) (declining to take no-action position where precious metals would be sold
on margin); Rare Metals Inv. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCII) 79,752 (Feb. 26, 1974) (silver rental program); cf Coin Vest,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII)
79,823 (Apr. 8, 1974) (discussing whether contracts relating to coin investments are
securities for purposes of Investment Company Act); New York v. First Meridian Planning
Corp., 86 N.Y.2d 608 (1995) (state law, following Howey). But see SEC v. Belmont Reid
& Co., Inc., 794 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that gold not yet extracted was not a
security).
121 Messer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 833 F.2d 909, 915 (11th Cir. 1987) (quoting Gordon
v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 741 (11th Cir. 1982)); see also infra text accompanying note 216.
122 388 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Some courts have considered the extent of an
investment manager's discretion not in the context of deciding whether the investor expected
to profit "solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party." SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). Instead, they have dealt with discretion in connection with the
question of whether there is a common enterprise. Thus, in Gamble v. Merrill Lynch, the
district court felt that it could avoid deciding whether to adopt narrow or broad vertical
commonality as the test of common enterprise, because the account in issue was not
discretionary. Gamble v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1982-1983 Transfer
Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCII) 99,046, at 94,988 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("Merrill Lynch was
not authorized to bring its investment expertise to bear on the plaintiffs' accounts. Its role was
purely ministerial. The complaint alleges only that Merrill Lynch represented that it would
fully execute the trades ordered by Karant [(the plaintffs' trading advisor)] on the plaintiffs'
behalf and would correct any mistakes. It did not manage the account, nor was it authorized
to make any trades not specified by Karant. There was, therefore, no common enterprise in
the arrangement .... "). In Alvord v. Shearson Hayden Stone, 485 F. Supp. 848 (D. Conn.
1980), another court held that an account that was "in essence" discretionary would satisfy
the common enterprise element, See id. at 853, with the plaintiff bearing the burden of
proving that the account was essentially a discretionary one. Id. at 852 n.4; see also Berman
v. Orimex Trading Co., 291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding that the formal grant of
discretion was unnecessary); Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705 (D.
Minn. 1968).
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of rare-coin portfolios was a sale of securities, 123 the court took the position th
the advisory assistance the defendants provided investors, together with tt
administrative services they offered, was enough managerial control to satisf
Howey. 124 A general extrapolation of this holding would mean that, even J
clients retain authority to approve or disapprove the recommendations o
investment managers, their accounts may nonetheless be securities. Indeed
even in Continental Commodities, so far as appears from the opinion, investort
retained the ultimate decision of whether to make specific investments. 125
Although the Supreme Court may some day say that it really meant
"solely" in Howey, it is more likely that lower courts will continue to take a
liberal position. Liberality is particularly appropriate in analyzing investment
management arrangements, for both practical and theoretical reasons.
Investment managers are not normally hired with the expectation that their
advice will be rejected, so many nondiscretionary accounts share with
discretionary accounts a real dependence on the managers' expertise and
effective manager control. 126 Moreover, the fundamental question raised by the
entire line of investment management cases is whether the choice of an
investment manager is itself an investment so that its promotion should be
regulated by treating management arrangements as securities. 127 If the question
is whether investors should be protected at the start of an investment
management relationship, then security status should not depend on precisely
123 See Brigadoon, 388 F. Supp. at 1293.
124 The court did give some weight to the fact that in many instances, the defendants'
clients entrusted the actual selection of coins purchased for the client to be made by the
defendants' agents in a manner which amounted to discretionary action by the agent. Yet the
court held the investment arrangements to be securities, even when the option to allow the
agent to select was not exercised, indicating that the crucial factor was that this option had
been offered. Brigadoon, 388 F. Supp. at 1292.
125 InMesser v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 833 F.2d 909 (11th Cir. 1987), the successor court
to the Fifth Circuit cited Continental Commodities as controlling precedent but stated that a
"'non-discretionary' account cannot constitute an 'investment contract.'" Id. at 915.
126 C Advisory Committee Report, supra note 62, at 19 (describing the position of SEC
staff in no-action letters as follows: "Accounts will be treated as discretionary for purposes of
determining the applicability of the registration requirements, even if discretionary authority is
not given by the customer so long as the customer is given to understand that only through
consistently following the adviser's advice will his objective be met or his business welcome
or, without such efforts to discourage the exercise of his independent judgment, the customer
in fact slavishly follows the adviser's recommendations.").
127 The Advisory Committee on Investment Management Services for Individual
Investors argued this point in its report to the SEC. See Advisory Committee Report, supra
note 62, at 23-24. The Committee also argued, however, that status as a security should
depend on the existence of discretionary authority. See id. at 24-25.
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w that arrangement is supposed to be conducted or how it turns out to be
,nducted, especially since neither party may be certain of what their future
lationship will be when they enter into it. There is much to be said on both
des of the question of whether investment management services are securities,
at the only argument for drawing the line at the existence of discretionary
athority is that there should be an objective basis for determining when the
aanagerial control element of Howey has been satisfied. The experience of the
ranchising cases, however, suggests that courts are not likely to accept the
irgument that the need for predictability justifies a bright-line rule. 128
Post-Howey legislative developments also suggest that even if discretionary
authority is essential, the concept of discretion should be taken to encompass
arrangements in which investors retain some control over the way their
managers' investment decisions are implemented. For example, section 3(a)(35)
of the Exchange Act provides that:
A person exercises "investment discretion" with respect to an account if,
directly or indirectly, such person (A) is authorized to determine what
securities or other property shall be purchased or sold by or for the account,
(B) makes decisions as to what securities or other property shall be purchased
or sold by or for the account even though some other person may have
responsibility for such investment decisions, or (C) othenvise exercises such
influence with respect to the purchase and sale of securities or other property
by or for the account as the Commission, by rule, determines, in the public
interest or for the protection of investors, should be subject to the operation of
the provisions of this title and the rules and regulations thereunder. 129
Although section 3(a)(35) was added to the Exchange Act as part of a set of
provisions regarding brokerage fees paid by fiduciaries and separation of
brokerage and money management, 130 the section reflects a legislative
recognition that the possibility of abuse attaches to managed accounts generally,
not just the subclass of fully discretionary accounts.
Discretionary accounts and other closely managed accounts are also treated
as alike in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, which
provides that a person is a fiduciary with respect to an employee benefit plan if
he either exercises discretionary authority or renders investment advice for
128 See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
129 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(35) (1994).
130 See B.INs, supra note 97, 119.0312], 10.02; Harvey Bines, Regulating
Discretionary Management: Broker-Dealers as Catalysts for Reform, 16 B.C. IhD. & CoM.
L. REV. 347, 379-85 (1975); see also Olympia & York Developments, Inc., 1991 SEC No-
Act. LEXIS 1189 (Sept. 20, 1991).
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compensation.' 31 Although again the purpose of this statute was not to settle the
question of whether investment management arrangements are securities, it
does reflect a legislative determination that discretionary accounts have much in
common with other managed accounts, and a decision that investment managers
cannot avoid regulation by leaving nominal control over an investment account
with their clients. 132
C. The Form of the Arrangement. The Status of Trust Relationships
Although the several federal securities statutes refer to investment
contracts, no particular form of arrangement between an investment manager
and a client is necessary to create a statutory security. In Howey, the Supreme
Court said that investment contract meant "a contract, transaction or
scheme" with certain attributes, 133 and since then the term investment contract
has demonstrated an amazing capacity to absorb the schemes of promoters
however they are constructed. Limited partnerships, 134 participations in oil and
131 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (1994).
132 The Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service have defined investment
advice to give meaning to the statutory term fiduciary. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21 (1995)
(Labor); 26 C.F.R. § 54.4975-9 (1995) (I.R.S.). Broadly speaking, a person who makes
recommendations about securities gives investment advice if such person either has actual
discretionary authority for the plan or provides individualized advisory assistance on a regular
basis pursuant to an established understanding that provides that the adviser will render
individualized advice for the plan and provides further that such advice will serve as a
primary basis for investment decisions. See also Bn~ms, supra note 97, 10.0312]. Whatever
the degree of managerial influence necessary to elevate a relationship to status as a security, it
is clear that without some influence over an investment program, no security is created.
Compare First Life Assurance Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII)
80,385 (1976) (holding that investment annuity programs are deemed to be securities
because, although company refrained from making investment recommendations, annuitant
could invest in securities issued by company, affiliate, or custodian) with Massachusetts Co.,
Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 80,338 (1975) (holding that
custodial accounts for transfer of money from fund shares to short-term debt instruments are
not securities); see also Stuyvesant Life Ins. Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L.
Rep. (CCH) 80,294 (1975) (holding that investment annuities are deemed to be securities
where issuer participates in decisions on investments).
133 SEC v. Howey Ct., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
134 See supra note 97 and accompanying text; see also Bosco v. Serhant, 836 F.2d 271
(7th Cir. 1987); Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1986); Siebel v. Scott, 725 F.2d 995
(5th Cir. 1984); Mayer v. Oil Field Sys. Corp., 721 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1983); McGreghar
Land Co. v. Meguiar, 521 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1975); Miltland Raleigh-Durham v. Myers,
807 F. Supp. 1025 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Sampson v. Invest America, 754 F. Supp. 928 (D.
Mass. 1990); Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aft'd, 553 F.2d 750 (2d
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gas investments, 135  pyramid schemes, 136  franchising arrangements, 137
condominium sales, 138 and a remarkable variety of other investment
arrangements 139 have all been held to be investment contracts, and a formal
agreement has not been required either.40 In any event, because investment
management arrangements in which the manager acts as an agent are typically
created by contract, the most significant issue the contract requirement-such as
it is-poses for those managing other people's money is the degree to which
trusts may be deemed statutory securities.
Neither the SEC nor the courts have been willing to permit the
Cir. 1977); NYSE v. Sloan, 394 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).135 See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943); Vale Natural Gas
Am. Corp. v. Carroilton Resources, 795 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. La. 1992).136 See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Glenn
W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973); SEC v. Steed Indus., Inc., [1974-
1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,917 (N.D. Il. 1974); see also SEC
Securities Act Release No. 5211, 1 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCI) 1048 (Nov. 30, 1971)
(discussing the applicability of the securities laws to multi-level distributorship and pyramid
sales plans).
137 See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
138 See Securities Act Release No. 5347, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1049 (Jan. 4,
1973) (discussing condominium offerings as securities). But see Revak v. SEC Realty Corp.,
18 F.3d 81, 88-89 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding a particular condominium offering not to be a
security). Similarly, real property interests in vacation developments marketed on their
investment appeal may be securities, whereas building lots generally are not. See, e.g.,
Rodriguez v. Banco Cent. Corp., 990 F.2d 7 (st Cir. 1993); Aldrich v. McCulloch Props.,
Inc., 627 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1980); Pliskin v. Bruno, 838 F. Supp. 658 (D. Me. 1993).
According to the SEC,
condominiums, coupled with a rental arrangement, will be deemed to be securities if
they are offered and sold through advertising, sales literature, promotional schemes or
oral representations which emphasize the economic benefits to the purchaser to be
derived from the managerial efforts of the promoter, or a third party designated or
arranged for by the promoter, in renting the units.
Securities Act Release No. 5347, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 1049, at 2071-72 (Jan. 4,
1973); see also HAzEN, supra note 13, § 1.5, at 38-39.
139 See, e.g., Smith v. Gross, 604 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1979) (involving earthworm
enterprise); Securities Act Release No. 5018, 1 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCII) 1047 (Nov. 4,
1969) (involving whiskey warehouse receipts). See generally HAZN, supra note 13, § 1.5, at
28-29; 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 948-56.
140 See, e.g., Scheer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 95,086 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that no proof
of entry into a formal contract was required to classify a discretionary commodities account as
a security).
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characterization of an investment vehicle as a trust to deter them from applying
the securities laws. 141 Thus, early in its administration, the SEC obtained an
injunction against an unregistered scheme to issue trust certificates, the proceeds
of which were to be commingled and used to acquire stock in a bank. 142 As the
Supreme Court has sometimes emphasized, substance and economic realities
rather than form determine classification as a security, 143 and the view that the
use of the trust form cannot control application of the federal securities laws
finds support in the well-established rule that formal compliance with state trust-
law requirements cannot control application of federal law. 144
The federal securities statutes themselves indicate that at least some trust
interests are securities. The definitions of the word security in the several
federal securities statutes do not list trusts or interests in trusts as securities, but
the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and the Investment Company Act all
include collateral-trust and voting-trust certificates in their definitions. 145
Similarly, the special treatment accorded to trusts in the definition of the term
issuer in the three acts indicates that trusts issue securities, and thus that at least
some interests in trusts are securities. 146 The references to trust certificates in
141 See, e.g., SEC v. Prof'l Assocs., 731 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that trusts
may be securities); Melton v. Unterreiner, 575 F.2d 204, 208-09 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding
that revocable inter vivos trusts used as method to sell undeveloped real estate are securities);
SEC v. Heritage Trust Co., 402 F. Supp. 744, 747-49 (D. Ariz. 1975) (same).
142 SECv. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939), appeal dismissed per
s'pulaion, 118 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1941); see also Independent Bankers' Ass'n, SEC No-
Action Letter, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 79,198 (Dec. 8,
1972) (two-level collective employee retirement trusts deemed to create a security even
though employees received only cash proceeds of the trusts and contributions came
exclusively from participating companies). But see Woodmoor Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 78,140 (Apr. 15, 1971) (limited
transferability of shares in trust tied to separate ownership deed on real estate placed trustee
essentially in position of a custodian; hence, trust participations deemed not to be securities).
143 See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990); Marine Bank v.
Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,
847-51 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).144 See I.R.C. §§ 671-679 (1994) (dealing with treatment of grantor-trusts).
145 Securities Act § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1994); Exchange Act § 3(a)(10), 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1994); Investment Company Act § 2(a)(36), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36)
(1994). See generally 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 1050-55, 1062.
146 See Securities Act § 2(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4) (1994); Exchange Act § 3(a)(8), 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8) (1994); Investment Company Act §§ 2(a)(22) (defining issuer to include
person who issues security), 2(a)(28) (defining person to include company), 2(a)(8) (defining
company to include trust), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(22), (28), (8) (1994); see also Securities
Act § 3(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(6) (involving issuer of equipment-trust certificates);
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these definitions might suggest that only trust interests represented by
(transferable) certificates are securities. 147 However, section 3(a)(2) of the
Securities Act now exempts interests and participations in a variety of single,
common, and collective trust funds, 148 and these exemptions would not be
necessary if such interests and participations were not securities in the first
place. 149
It is well settled that some trust interests are securities,150 such as shares in
mutual funds organized as business trusts.151 On the other hand, ordinary
Securities Act Release No. 97, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 1021 (Dec. 28, 1933) (irvolving
voting-trust certificates); 2 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 13, at 1055-56.
147 See also Securities Act § 2(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2) (1994) ("As used in this
paragraph [i.e., the definition of the term person] the term 'trust' shall include only a trust
where the interest or interests of the beneficiary or beneficiaries are evidenced by a
security."); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933) ("The term 'trust' is defined
to exclude the ordinary noncommercial trust but to include that type of organization,
commonly known as a 'business trust' or a 'Massachusetts trust', which, without resort to the
device of incorporation, is used to achieve many of the purposes of the ordinary business
corporation."); 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 1062.
148 See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1994). Section 39(c)(3) of the Investment Company Act
provides an analogous exemption for collective trusts.
149 See 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 1062 n.452 ("reading the phrase
'evidenced by a security' [in section 2(2) of the Securities Act] to require that there be some
tangible token of the beneficiary's interest in the trust, or that the interest be transferable,
would frustrate the legislative purpose, since a business trust could be operated with neither
certificates nor free transferability").150 See cases cited supra note 141.
151 See 2 Loss & SEuGMAN, supra note 13, at 1060-62; Sheldon A. Jones et al., The
Massachusetts Business Trust and Registered Investment Companies, 13 DEL. J. CoRP. L.
421 (1988). The SEC considers real estate investment trusts, which have pass-through tax
treatment comparable to that of investment companies, outside the exclusion of section
3(c)(5)(C) of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(5)(C) (1994) (involving
companies "purchasing or otherwise acquiring mortgages and other liens on and interests in
real estate") if they make substantial investments in other such trusts or in companies engaged
in the real estate business. See Investment Company Act Release No. 3140, 5 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 47,356 (Nov. 29, 1960); see also Investment Company Act Release No. 8456,
5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 47,357 (Aug. 9, 1974); Manuel F. Cohen & Robert C. Hacker,
Applicability of the Investment Company Act of 1940 to Real Estate Syndications, 36 OHio ST.
L.J. 482 (1975). The SEC has taken the position that a wide variety of trust interests may be
securities. See, e.g., International Asset Management, Inc., 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 294
(Jan. 29, 1990); Morgan Stanley & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1986-1987 Transfer
Binder] Fel. Sec. L. Rep. (CCI-) 78,337, at 77,066 (Dec. 4, 1985); Northwestern Ohio
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, SEC No-Action Letter, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 77,662 (Apr. 20, 1984); Merrill Lynch, SEC No-Action Letter, [1982-
1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 77,310 (Sept. 28, 1982).
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testamentary and irrevocable inter vivos trusts are not generally regarded as
securities. 52 Classification may be easy at the extremes. The difficult question
is whether an investment management arrangement's status as a trust is relevant
to its status as a security.
Some provisions of federal securities law implicitly recognize a structural
distinction between trust and agency accounts. A striking example is the
contrasting classifications afforded participations in various collective
investment vehicles under the Glass-Steagall Act. 153 National banks are
authorized by statute to manage collective trust funds of various types, 154 and,
as stated above, participations in many such trusts are exempt from registration
under the Securities Act. 155 In Investment Company Institute v. Camp,156
however, the Supreme Court interpreted the Glass-Steagall Act to prohibit
banks from managing commingled agency accounts, regardless of compliance
with the federal securities laws. 157 Because, as a practical matter, investment
management activities on behalf of commingled trust funds are similar to those
performed for commingled agency accounts, both of which in turn are managed
much like open-end investment companies, the Court's construction of the
Glass-Steagall Act suggests an important distinction between the status of
participations in trusts on the one hand and agency vehicles on the other.
The precise holding of Camp was that participations in commingled agency
accounts are securities, and that in marketing such securities, a commercial
bank is engaged in underwriting securities, thereby violating the separation of
commercial banking and investment banking activities imposed by the Glass-
Steagall Act. 158 Of greater moment for purposes of determining whether an
investment manager can avoid application of the securities laws by structuring
an investment management arrangement as a trust, however, is the Court's
citation of the fiduciary nature of trust services as the rationale for
distinguishing forbidden participations in commingled agency accounts from
permissible investment accounts traditionally managed by the trust departments
of commercial banks. Expressing concern over promotional pressures capable
152 See 2 Loss & SEuGMAN, supra note 13, at 1060-64; see also 1 Frankel, supra note
16, § F22, at 281 ("A private trust is not a security.").
153 See Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (June 16, 1933) (codified throughout
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., cbs. 2, 3, 6).154 See 12 U.S.C. § 92a (1994); see also Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617,
624-25 (1971).
155 See supra note 148 and accompanying text; see also Investment Company Act
§ 3(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(3) (1994) (stating that bank-maintained common trust funds
are not investment companies).
156 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
157 See id. at 630.
158 See id. at 639.
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of undermining traditional bank conservatism, the Court contrasted client
expectations in the establishment of trust accounts with the attitude that might
characterize participants in a commingled agency vehicle. 159 Because the
demands of the latter group would be for investment return alone, the Court
concluded that "there is a plain difference between the sale of fiduciary services
and the sale of investments." 160
Camp might be understood to establish that when an investment
management arrangement entails fiduciary service, it is not a security, at least
for purposes of the Glass-Steagall Act. However, interests in some trusts plainly
are securities, even though the trustee owes fiduciary duties to the trust
beneficiaries. 161 Nor did the Court in Camp suggest that every trust activity
would survive scrutiny under the Glass-Steagall Act. On the contrary, the Court
emphasized that for a long time after the Glass-Steagall Act's enactment, the
Federal Reserve Board had permitted banks to use common trust funds only for
"strictly fiduciary purposes." 162 While Camp's investment-intent rationale may
explain why participations in commingled agency accounts are securities, it
does not offer a satisfactory test for determining when participations in trust
vehicles are not.
For investment managers trying to minimize the burden of the federal
securities laws, the critical task is to determine whether an investment
management arrangement that would otherwise be a security will not be if it is
structured as some form of a trust. In this respect, Camp's reference to the
"true fiduciary purpose" 163 of a trust relationship may have some bearing,
159 See id. at 638.
160 See id.
161 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
162 Camp, 401 U.S. at 621,
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System which until 1962 had regulatory
jurisdiction over all the trust activities of national banks, allowed the collective
investment of trust assets only for "the investment of funds held for true fiduciary
purposes." The applicable regulation... specified that "the operation of such Common
Trust Funds as investment trusts for other than strictly fiduciary purposes is hereby
prohibited." The Board consistently ruled that it was improper for a bank to use "a
Common Trust Fund as an investment trust attracting money seeking investment alone
and to embark upon what would be in effect the sale of participations in a Common
Trust Fund to the public as investments."
Id. (quoting 26 Fed. Res. Bull. 393 (1940)).
163 401 U.S. at 638 (emphasis added).
[The hazards of a collective investment fund] are all hazards that are not present when a
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inasmuch as it suggests that the fiduciary service underlying a trust relationship
that is not a security includes much more than a mere investment management
service. 164
The distinction the Court drew between commingling trust funds and
commingling agency funds suggests that typical testamentary and irrevocable
inter vivos trusts may escape security status. While the Court's view of classical
trusteeship may not describe the services desired by those establishing
institutional and individual revocable trusts, settlors of conventional
testamentary and irrevocable inter vivos trusts are motivated to establish trusts
by a desire for special services and care for their beneficiaries, not merely
investment guidance. 165 Of course, settlors of testamentary and irrevocable
bank undertakes to purchase stock for the account of its individual customers or to
commingle assets which it has received for a true fiduciary purpose rather than for
investment. These activities, unlike the operation of an investment fund, do not give rise
to a promotional or salesman's stake in a particular investment; they do not involve an
enterprise in direct competition with aggressively promoted funds offered by other
investment companies; they do not entail a threat to public confidence in the bank itself;
and they do not impair the bank's ability to give disinterested service as a fiduciary or
managing agent. In short, there is a plain difference between the sale offiduciary
services and the sale of investments.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing 26 Fed. Res. Bull. 393 (1940), which is quoted supra in note
162); see also Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(13), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(13) (1994)
(defining investment supervisory services).
164 Since Camp, however, the presence of a trust seems to have become the de facto test
of Glass-Steagall compliance. Thus, commercial banks may offer common trusts for
individual retirement accounts. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 790 F.2d 925, 930
(D.C. Cir. 1986) ("The existence of a trust relationship is sufficient, by itself, to take this
case out of Camp's express teaching."); Investment Co. Inst. v. Clarke, 789 F.2d 175 (2d
Cir. 1986); Investment Co. Inst. v. Clarke, 793 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1986); see also 2 Loss &
SEUGMAN, supra note 13, at 1028-29; Langevoort, supra note 23, at 707-09; Stokely G.
Caldwell, Jr., Note, Glass-Steagall and Collective Investment Trusts for Individual Retirement
Accounts: Fiduciary Purpose or Investment?, 42 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 961 (1985). As noted
below, these common trusts have been treated as securities for purposes of the Securities Act
and the Investment Company Act, in large part because they are not considered primarily
fiduciary. See infra note 169.
165 The point is not that the settlors of conventional trusts are indifferent to investment
management, but that they seek more. Cf. Conover, 790 F.2d at 937 (Glass-Steagall Act)
("[W]e do not believe that Citibank's characterization of the Trust as an 'investment
opportunity' should bear on whether the Trust constitutes a bona fide fiduciary service. The
two terms are not mutually exclusive. Any fiduciary service is also an investment opportunity
if by that one means an opportunity to earn a retum on one's money; very few customers
would likely be satisfied with the services of a bank's trust department if the bank did no more
than safekeep their funds. We agree with the Comptroller that the proper inquiry is whether
19971
OHO STATE LAW JOURNAL
inter vivos trusts presumably want to realize a good return and protect the
corpus. However, other objectives are also important to them, including
shepherding resources, fairly apportioning benefits among beneficiaries and
balancing the interests of immediate beneficiaries against those of
remaindermen. If the test for classification of a trust account as a security is the
primacy of investment intent, indicia of such intent might include
irrevocability 166 and an underlying transfer of the use of assets from the settlor
to another beneficiary. 167
Camp involved the definition of security under the Glass-Steagall Act, and
perhaps it does not govern definitional questions under the securities statutes.
Although the Court did say that the definition of security under the Glass-
Steagall Act was not to be construed narrowly, it stopped short of equating it to
the definitions in the securities statutes. 168 Camp thus left open the possibility
that trust participations that are not securities under the Glass-Steagall Act might
the bank is offering a genuine fiduciary service in addition to an opportunity to earn a
return."). Ironically perhaps, portfolio managers for conventional trusts typically handle many
more accounts than do pension fund and investment advisory account managers, while they
are usually less experienced and competent as investment managers than the latter. See
EDWARD S. HERMAN, CoNFucrs OF INtmE: COMMERCIAL BANK Tausr D A, ammNTS
59(1975).
166 But see International Asset Management, Inc., 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 294 (Jan.
29, 1990) (declining to give no-action assurance for irrevocable term trust arrangement); infra
note 179 and accompanying (discussing International Asset Management). As discussed
below, the Philanthropy Protection Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-62, 109 Stat. 682 (1995),
has exempted certain charitable collective investment funds from the definition of investment
company under the Investment Company Act. See infra text accompanying notes 188-97. The
statute provides only conditional relief for funds that include revocably donated assets, Pub.
L. No. 104-62 § 2(a) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(10)(B)(vi), (vii)), on the theory
that "donors of revocable gifts may not have a 'true charitable intent' as opposed to the
'intention of an investor.'" H.R. REP. No. 104-333, supra note 35, at 11-12 (1995),
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 627.
167 See Langevoort, supra note 24, at 708 n.122; see also 2 Loss & SEUMIAN, supra
note 13, at 1062-63 n.452 ("It has accordingly been suggested that a better line to achieve the
legislative purpose is Professor Scott's, to the effect that one useful classification of the
principal purposes of trusts is 'a general division into trusts created for the purpose of
distributing the bounty of the settlor and trusts created for business purposes.'") (quoting 2
Austn WAKEmAN ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSrs 514 (2d ed. 1956), quoted in tum in Robert
H. Mundheim & Gordon D. Henderson, Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to
Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 795, 803 (1964)). But see
supra note 164 (explaining that common trusts for individual retirement accounts are not
securities for purposes of the Glass-Steagall Act).
168 See Camp, 401 U.S. at 635.
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be securities under the Securities Act.169 On the other hand, the factor of
investment intent that Camp made the essential feature of a "Glass-Steagall Act
security" supports the conclusion that participations in testamentary trusts and
run-of-the-mill irrevocable inter vivos trusts are not securities under either
statute. Courts and the SEC's Division of Investment Management have insisted
that under the securities statutes, trusts are securities when the settlor's primary
motivation is not to secure fiduciary services.170 On the other hand, when the
settlor's primary purpose is to get fiduciary care, it hardly seems that settlors or
beneficiaries require the separate protection of the securities statutes, especially
since disclosure under those statutes would be inadequate for their protection in
any event.
Howey held that an investment contract under the securities statutes is an
arrangement in which the investor is "led to expect profits," 171 and this might
169 In Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, the Court looked to the definition
of the term security in the Securities Act to illuminate the meaning of the term in the Glass-
Steagall Act. 468 U.S. 137, 150-52 (1984). But see id. at 160, 174-75 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (distinguishing the statutes). However, the D.C. Circuit has since held that the
word means different things in the two statutes. See Conover, 790 F.2d at 933-34; see also
id. at 929 ("According to the Comptroller, moreover, 'the meaning of the term securities
under the securities law [is] not necessarily synonymous with its meaning under the Glass-
Steagall Act.'") (quoting Comptroller's ruling). In any event, the SEC has insisted that
beneficial interests in common trust funds for individual retirement accounts are securities,
and banks that have offered such interests have registered them under the Securities Act and
registered the funds under the Investment Company Act while at the same time insisting that
they are not offering securities for purposes of the Glass-Steagall Act. See, e.g., id. at 928
n.4; Commercial Bank, 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 257 (Feb. 24, 1988); United Missouri
Bank, 1981 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 4473 (Dec. 31, 1981); see also Elizabeth K. Norsworthy,
Common Trust Funds-A Three-Dimensional Puzzle with Pieces that Never Fit, 3 INV. LAw.
at 23-24 (May 1996).
170 See cases cited supra note 151; Commercial Bank, 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 257,
at *1-2 (Feb. 24, 1988) ("[Ihe [Investment Company Act] Section 3(c)(3) exclusion is
available only if the common trust fund holds funds from individual trust accounts created by
customers for bona fide fiduciary purposes. Bona fide fiduciary purposes involve, broadly
speaking, those situations in which a bank is providing to individual trust accounts traditional
estate planning and other fiduciary services, but not primarily money management."); First
Jersey Nat'l Bank 1987 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2797 (Nov. 13, 1987); United Missouri Bank,
1981 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 4473, at *2 (Dec. 31, 1981) ("The exception provided by section
3(c)(3) [of the Investment Company Act], the so-called 'common trust fund' exception,
applies only to a common trust fund for moneys which a bank has received for bona fide
fiduciary purposes."); Wells Fargo Bank, 1977 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1823 (July 15, 1977);
Norsworthy, supra note 169.
171 Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99. Another useful indicator of a settlor's interest is the
nature of the marketing program which attracted her to the trustee in the first place. See infra
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be read to exclude trusts of the classical variety, in which the primary motive of
the settlor is something other than an expectation of profits. The Supreme Court
developed the concept of "expectation of profits" in United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Fonnan,172 in which it held that shares of stock of Co-op
City (a subsidized residential cooperative) that entitled the owners to live in an
apartment in the cooperative were not securities. 173 The owners argued that the
shares were investment contracts because their rent was to be reduced by virtue
"of net income derived from the leasing by Co-op City of commercial facilities,
professional offices and parking spaces, and its operation of community
washing machines." 174 The Court was not convinced, however, in part because
the desired profits were "speculative," "insubstantial" and only "incidental" to
the purpose of their investment, 175 and, more to the point as the Court saw it,
because the plaintiffs had been motivated to buy their shares "solely by the
prospect of acquiring a place to live, and not by financial returns on their
investments. "176
On an investment-consumption continuum, conventional inter vivos and
testamentary trusts fall somewhere between investment transactions that are
clearly securities, and consumption transactions that are not. Trust settlors
typically want a good return, and the expectation of profits cannot be said to be
insubstantial. 177 On the other hand, when settlors set up conventional trusts,
their primary goal is to gain trusteeship, and investment return is in an
important sense only an "incidental" goal. Fornan suggests that an investor's
motive matters, and it supports the proposition that the test for classifying a
trust under the securities statutes is the relative importance of the settlor's
investment intent. 178
Part ll.C.
172 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
173 See id. at 847.
174 Id. at 855-56.
175 Id. at 856-57.
176 Id. at 853; see also International Blid. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 561-62
(1979).
177 See supra note 165.
178 Cf SEC v. Heritage Trust Co., 402 F. Supp. 744, 749 (D. Ariz. 1975) ("The Court
has reviewed the recent Supreme Court decision in United Housing Foundaion, Inc. v.
Fornan .... Although defendants' sales brochures placed some emphasis on avoidance of
probate as one of the advantages of a trust, it is also clear that the prime inducement was
investment expertise, safety, and assured substantial return. It is difficult to believe any trustor
would have invested without anticipation of a safe investment and a profitable return. United
Housing does not dictate a result different from that reached here."); 2 Loss & SELGMAN,
supra note 13, at 939 (Forman's "notion involves a weighing of the purposes of an
investment. When the profit-producing purpose is incidental, the purchase will not be
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Recent developments further obscure the question of whether a trust
designed and used to accomplish ends beyond investment management may be
a security. In 1990, the SEC's Division of Investment Management refused to
assure International Asset Management, Inc. ("IAM"), an investment manager,
that it would not recommend enforcement action if IAM marketed trust
arrangements designed to protect the assets of wealthy investors against court
judgments. 179 IAM proposed that wealthy investors would place substantial
assets in trusts organized in foreign jurisdictions that might not enforce
judgments of United States courts. 180 An affiliate of LAM would offer
investment management services to the trusts, although a settlor could elect to
direct the trust's investments. Settlors would be entitled to replace the trustees
of their trusts (including another IAM affiliate), except at times when they were
subject to litigation in the United States. 1 81 This right, IAM suggested, would
lead it to provide each settlor individualized service and to follow his or her
directions, for fear that otherwise the settlor would terminate LAM's lucrative
connection to the trust 182
IAM argued that, because the settlor of each trust would effectively control
its investments and would receive individualized attention, the trusts would not
be securities, and hence that the trusts as a group would not be an investment
company.1 83 However, the Division of Investment Management was concerned
because a settlor would lose the power to replace the trustees in the event the
settlor was subject to legal action in the United States. 184 Moreover, the
Division was not persuaded that LAM's practical incentive to please the settlors
would ensure that each settlor would "receive sufficiently individualized
treatment (especially the ability to retain the indicia of ownership over the
securities in its Account)." 185 Absent assurances of individualized treatment,
the Division was unwilling to agree that the proposed trust arrangements were
not securities. ' 86
International Asset Management was not a litigated case, and it may simply
reflect the reluctance of the Division of Investment Management to give its
imprimatur to a complicated and not altogether attractive arrangement.
denominated a security.").
179 See International Asset Management, Inc., 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 294, at *4-5
(Jan. 29, 1990); see also International Asset Management, Inc., 1989 SEC No-Act LEXIS
1026 (Oct. 11, 1989).
180 See International Asset Management, Inc., 1990 SEC No-Act LEXIS 294, at *4-5.
181 See id. at *35.
182 See id. at *29.
183 See infra Part II (discussing investment companies).
184 See International Asset Management, Inc. 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 294, at *3.
185 Id. at*4.
186 See id. at *39.
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Moreover, IAM's plan contemplated that assets would typically return to the
settlor at the end of the trust term, and perhaps the Division viewed the plan as
the sale of an exotic financial instrument, not as a method for transferring
wealth with strings attached. 187 However, it is noteworthy that the Division
focused on the lack of individualized attention, and seemed unmoved by the fact
that settlors creating such trusts would likely have been moved more by the
desire to protect substantial personal assets from litigation than by a desire for
investment guidance.
In 1995, Congress touched upon the possibility that trust interests may be
securities in the Philanthropy Protection Act, 188 which accords special treatment
under the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and the Investment Company Act
to charities that operate charitable pooled income funds, which are often
organized as trusts. 189 Charitable donors transfer assets to these funds while
retaining some property interest, typically a right to an income stream for life.
The funds in turn commingle the donated assets, pay income to donors, and
eventually pass along what is left to the charity.
Interests in such trusts would seem to be securities under Howey: the donor
contributes money to a common enterprise (the fund) with the expectation of
receiving profits (the retained income stream) arising from the efforts of others
(the managers of the fund). The staff of the SEC has given such funds
assurance that it will not recommend action under the Securities Act or the
Investment Company Act if they meet certain conditions. 19° No-action letters
may not bind private parties, however, and after a party brought an action
alleging that the fund should have registered under the Investment Company
Act, 191 Congress promptly acted to codify the SEC's no-action position. It
amended the Investment Company Act to exclude charitable pooled income
funds, collective trust funds, and similar funds from the definition of investment
187 See supra text accompanying note 167.
188 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3a (1995).
189 See H.R. REP. No. 104-333, supra note 166, at 5, 10, reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 620, 626.
190 In an interpretative release, the SEC stated that a fund must satisfy three conditions:
(1) The fund must qualify to receive tax deductible contributions under section 642(c)(5) of
the Internal Revenue Code; (2) written disclosures must be given to each prospective donor;
and (3) contributions to the fund must be solicited by a volunteer or employee whose
compensation is not based on the amount of gifts. See Securities Act Release No. 33-6175, 5
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 47,374 (Jan. 10, 1980) codified at 17 C.F.R. § 71.11016 (1996);
see also H.R. REP. No. 104-333, supra note 166, at 7, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
622.
191 See H.R. REP. No. 104-333, supra note 35, at 8, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 623-24.
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company, 192 and amended the Securities Act and the Exchange Act to make
interests in such funds exempted securities under those statutes.193
The Philanthropy Protection Act took an interesting approach to charitable
collective trust funds.194 They are now excluded from the definition of
investment companies, but they are only exempt from registration under the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act; they may still be securities under those
statutes, and indeed the legislative history suggests that they are, emphasizing as
it does that the antifraud provisions of those statutes will still be available to the
defrauded party.195 The House Commerce Committee's report on the
Philanthropy Protection Act-the only committee report-explains that the Act
codifies the SEC staffs position, which it explains as follows:
The rationale for the staff s position with respect to charitable income funds is
that the primary purpose of persons who transfer property to these funds is to
make a charitable donation, not to make an investment. The staff has
concluded that this donative intent-combined with, among other things, the
protections afforded by disclosure to donors and the applicability of the anti-
fraud provisions of the securities laws to the operations of charitable income
funds-makes registration under the Federal securities laws unnecessary. 196
This approach gives uncertain guidance for those creating traditional trusts,
whose "primary purpose," like that of donors to charitable collective trusts, is
to do something other than make an investment. 197 In the Philanthropy
Protection Act, Congress apparently decided that when a buyer's primary
purpose for investing money is not to maximize income, registration under the
Securities Act ought not to be required. Nonetheless, it left such investments as
securities (if not as securities issued by investment companies), subject to the
statutory antifraud provisions. Of course, Congress did not address the settlors
of traditional trusts, and perhaps the most that can be said of them in light of
this legislation is that the reason a settlor parts with money is apparently
important, but not necessarily dispositive.
192 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(10)(1994).
193 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(4)(1994) (Securities Act amendment); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c, 781
(1994) (Exchange Act amendment).
194 The Philanthropy Protection Act also amends the Investment Company Act to
require fluds to give information statements to donors, but this requirement is not a condition
of the exemption. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7(e) (1995); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-333, supra note
35, at 13, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 628-29.
195 See H.R. REP. No. 104-333, supra note 35, at 8, 10, 13, reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 624, 626, 629.
196 Id. at 7, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 623.
197 See supra note 166 (noting special treatment of funds holding revocable gifts).
19971
01HO STATELAWJOURNAL
III. INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS AS
INVESTMENT COMPANIES
The Securities Act and the Exchange Act are not the only federal securities
statutes implicated when investment management arrangements are securities.
Individual arrangements that are securities may also collectively constitute an
investment company subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940. An
investment company is "any issuer which... is or holds itself out as being
engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of
investing... in securities." 198 The critical word issuer is defined to include
any "person who issues or proposes to issue any security," 199 a person in turn
includes "a company," 200 which includes "any organized group of persons
whether incorporated or not."201 Within this structure, a set of managed
accounts may be regarded as an organized group and therefore a statutory
company. 202 If the managed accounts are securities, then the group of managed
198 Investment Company Act § 3(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (1994).
199 Investment Company Act § 2(a)(22), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(22) (1994) ("'issuer'
means every person who issues or proposes to issue any security, or has outstanding any
security which it has issued.").
200 Investment Company Act § 2(a)(28), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(28) (1994).
201 Investment Company Act § 2(a)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(8) (1994) ("'Company'
means a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a trust, a fund, or
any organized group of persons whether incorporated or not; or any receiver, trustee in
bankruptcy or similar official or any liquidating agent for any of the foregoing, in his capacity
as such.").
202 See generally Investment Company Act Release No. 21,260, supra note 62. The
House Commerce Committee's report on the recently enacted Philanthropy Protection Act of
1995 recognizes that, given the structure of the Investment Company Act, a set of investment
accounts may be an investment company. H.R. REP. No. 104-333, supra note 35, at 6,
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 621-22.
The treatment of unincorporated entities as investment companies has been one of the
more complicated developments of the federal securities laws, but it is now well settled that
such entities may be investment companies. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. SEC, 326 F.2d 383,
388 (3d Cir. 1964) (holding that a segregated variable annuity account was an investment
company); see also SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., 751 F.2d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1984)
("The SEC points out that the authority of the Prudential case has not been questioned by any
court in the twenty years since it was decided. We have no disposition to assume such a role,
and we perceive no valid distinction between Pudential and the case before us."); Investment
Company Act Release No. 21,260, supra note 62, at 86,967 n. 14; cf. SEC v. United Benefit
Life Ins., 387 U.S. 202 (1967) (reserving question of whether collective investment fund
should be separated from insurance company and considered an investment company). See
generally 2 Loss & SEuGMAN, supra note 13, at 1009 ("If all this startles at first blush, it
must be remembered that a corporation, too, is apersonaficta; one gets used to the idea.").
[Vol. 58:459
INVESTMENT MANA GEMENT
accounts is an issuer (i.e., a company issuing securities (the accounts)). Finally,
inasmuch as the purpose of the managed accounts is to invest in securities, the
group of accounts is an issuer engaged in investing in securities, and hence an
investment company. 203
The legislative policy implicit in the Investment Company Act justifies
treating related managed accounts as an investment company. Most of the
dangers recited in section 1(b) of the Investment Company Act204 are present to
a large degree when many individual accounts are under the control of a single
investment manager. Like investment advisers to mutual funds, investment
managers can exercise control over their clients' investment decisions, can
serve their own purposes by placing overvalued securities in their clients'
portfolios, 205 can overtrade or engage in other questionable trading practices to
generate commissions for their own purposes,2 6 and can subject their clients'
accounts to unsafe leverage in hopes of improving investment performance. 207
Without the Investment Company Act, owners of managed accounts, unlike
investors in investment companies, would be without the protection provided
203 See Investment Company Act § 3(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (1994). A set of
managed accounts may be an investment company even if the portfolio of the managed
accounts does not consist exclusively of securities. Section 3(a)(1) declares an issuer to be an
investment company if it is engaged "primarily" in the business of securities investment.
Section 3(a)(3) provides a numerical test: it includes any issuer that "is engaged or proposes
to engage in the business of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities,
and owns or proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per
centum of the value of such issuer's total assets. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(3). Because, in
many cases, there would be no intent to form a statutory investment company, a set of
managed accounts, if subject to the Investment Company Act, might be considered an
"inadvertent" investment company. See generally Edmund H. Kerr, The Inadvertent
Investment Company.. Section 3(a)(3) of the Investment Company Act, 12 STAN. L. REV. 29
(1959); Cohen & Hacker, supra note 151.
204 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b) (1994). See generally 3 FRANKEL, supra note 16, ch. 18 § A2
(discussing policies underlying Investment Company Act); Advisory Committee Report, supra
note 62, 39-58 (discussing investor protection and small-account management services).
205 See BINEs, supra note 97, 10.0612]. Similarly, assets might be moved from one
mutual fund to another in anticipation of stock market moves. In SEC v. Fundpack, Inc.,
[1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,951 (D.D.C. 1979), a special master
was appointed to supervise the election of a new board of directors for a mutual fund that the
court found to have been the victim of inadequate disclosure, self-dealing, and breach of
fiduciary duty in connection with such practices. See id. at 95,981-82. The SEC charged the
practices had caused wide fluctuations in the fund's net assets, thereby causing the fund to
incur extraordinary operating costs and investment losses that had not been disclosed to
shareholders. See id. at 95,979.
2 06 See Bu-Es, supra note 97, 10.0611].
207 See id. 5.03[2].
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registered investment companies by outside directors, or the specific statutory
restrictions on transactions with affiliates and interested persons. 20 8
The current law governing whether managed accounts are investment
companies can be traced back to the late 1960s, when First National City Bank
("Citibank") and Merrill Lynch offered a discretionary management program
that essentially placed an investor into one of two portfolios depending on
whether her objective was income or growth.20 9 Although the program was
promoted as one offering individualized advice, in a 1970 lawsuit, the SEC
took the position that the similarity of portfolios rendered each separate account
a security, and that Citibank was operating an unregistered investment
company. 210 The case eventually settled, with the SEC indicating that the bank
could offer similar services to small customers, so long as the bank did not have
discretionary authority over investments and customers were given a choice
over which brokerage firm would handle their accounts. Since then, the SEC's
staff has continued to take the position that the Investment Company Act is
implicated if substantially similar advice is rendered to each of a group of
accounts. 211 The staff also asserted, in a related development, that participations
208 See Investment Company Act §§ 10, 15, 17(a)-(e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-10, -15,
-17(a)-(e) (1994). Most legal constraints against self-dealing as exist are aspects of the general
antifraud provisions rather than detailed rules of conduct. C. Investment Advisers Act
§ 206(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (1994) (stating that disclosure and written approval are
necessary if adviser purchases or sells as principal).
209 The program, the Special Investment Advisory Service, was structured so that the
customers would give the bank a power of attorney along with a deposit of at least $25,000,
together with instructions to invest in a particular portfolio of securities. The makeup of the
portfolio depended on whether the customer's objective was income or growth, but all
accounts opened at the same time with the same objective would be invested in the same
portfolio.
2 10 See SEC v. First Nat'l City Bank, Litigation Release No. 4534, [1969-1970
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,592 (Feb. 6, 1970).
2 11 See Investment Company Act Release No. 21,260, supra note 35, at 86,967; Clarke
Lanzen Skalla Investment Firm, Inc., Investment Company Act Release No. 21,140, 1995
SEC LEXIS 1508 (June 16, 1995); International Asset Management, Inc., 1990 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 294, at *2 (Jan. 29, 1990); Finanswer America/Investments, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,111, at 80,406 (Mar. 26,
1971).
Registration of such an arrangement under the Investment Company Act would be
necessary where substantially the same, or substantially overlapping, advice is rendered
to each account or to a discernible group or groups of accounts, and where such accounts
engage in the same securities transactions. Also, the interests offered in such an
arrangement (the accounts) may be securities required to be registered ....
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in a security are themselves securities, and that those participations, taken
collectively, constitute an investment company.212
Shortly after settling Citibank, the SEC established an Advisory Committee
on Investment Management Services for Individual Investors.213 The
Committee concluded that individual ownership of securities in an investment
account is so unlike the status of shareholders of traditional investment
companies as to justify treating them differently.214 Accordingly, the
Committee concluded that an investment advisory arrangement should not have
to register under the Investment Company Act, so long as the investors owned
all their investments directly and the managers did not pool the assets of several
managed accounts.215 The Committee did conclude, however, that advisory
services may constitute securities subject to the registration requirements of the
Securities Act:
Mhe Committee believes that, under certain circumstances, the promotion and
operation of an investment advisory service may involve a public offering of
securities in the form of discretionary accounts. An investment service which is
operated on a discretionary basis and does not afford investors individual
attention would appear to be offering an investment contract or security, and if
substantially the same investment advice is given to all clients or to discermble
groups of clients, and clients are generally solicited, there could be a public
Id.; see also Benchmark Sec., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder]
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,424, at 86,117 (Jan. 9, 1976).212 See Josephthal & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 80,116, at 85,125 (Nov. 25, 1974) (stating that participations in
certificates of deposit and other commercial instruments are securities; the offeror may be an
investment company); Arthur E. Fox, SEC No-Action Letter, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,082, at 85,036 (Nov. 12, 1974) (stating that participations in a
large-denomination certificate of deposit are securities; the offeror of the participations is an
investment company); see also Morgan Stanley & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1986-1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 78,337, at 77,066 (Dec. 4, 1985) (referring to
the "long-standing position" of the SEC's Division of Investment Management, "that the
offer and sale to the public of certificates representing undivided participations in a security
involves the offer and sale of a security separate from the underlying security and that the
issuer of the separate security is subject to the 1940 Act, absent an appropriate exception or
exemption").
213 When it announced establishment of the Committee, the SEC explained that an
"advisory service which makes large-scale solicitations of relatively small accounts and
provides substantially the same advice to clients can become functionally indistinguishable
from an investment company." Investment Company Act Release No. 7423, 1972 SEC
LEXIS 24, at *1 (Oct. 12, 1972).
2 14 See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 62, at 22-24.
215 See id.
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offering of one or more investment contracts or securities which should be
registered under the Securities Act.2 16
In 1980, the SEC proposed a rule to address the question of whether a set
of advisory accounts is an investment company. 217 It explained that since the
law in this area was not fully developed, it did not believe it would be
appropriate to adopt a rule defining specifically which investment management
services must register as investment companies. 218 Instead, the SEC proposed
Investment Company Act Rule 3a-4, which would have provided a safe harbor
from registration under the Investment Company Act for investment managers
who provided their clients with individualized treatment. 219 The proposed rule
would have required a manager to furnish continuous advice based on the
individual needs of each client.2 20 The safe harbor in the proposed rule would
also have been conditioned on the client's maintaining all indicia of ownership
of the securities held in the account and the right to instruct a manager to
refrain from making particular investments. 2 1
The proposed rule generated some controversy and was never adopted. 22
Nonetheless, the SEC's Division of Investment Management has regularly
granted no-action letters to managers who have represented that they would
comply with the terms of the proposed rule.223 Over time, however, the
2 1 6 Id. at23.
2 17 See Individualized Investment Management Services, SEC Investment Company Act
Release No. 11,391 [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCM) 82,662 (Oct. 10,
1980)
218 See id. at 83,572.
2 19 See id. at 83,573.
220 The proposed rule would have required a significant amount of contact between the
investment manager and its client, including an initial interview, followed by subsequent
interviews at least annually, quarterly reports to the client, availability for consultation, and
maintenance of the indicia of ownership by the client. See id. at 83,575.
22 1 See id. The proposed release also indicated that if a management arrangement was
operated within the proposed rule's safe harbor, the Division of Corporation Finance would
not recommend enforcement action under the registration provisions of the Securities Act with
respect to the arrangement. See id. at n.15.
222 The tenor of comments on the proposed rule is interesting. Most commentators
opposed the rule as being overly burdensome on managers, but the Investment Company
Institute, which represents registered investment companies, complained that the rule would
have allowed de facto investment companies to escape regulation. See Investment Company
Act Release No. 21,260, supra note 62, at 86,968.
22 3 See id. at 86,968-99; see also Morgan Keegan & Co., 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
1168 (Oct. 2, 1990); Qualivest Capital Management, Inc., 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1035
(July 30, 1990); United Missouri Bank, SEC No-Action Letter, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CC-) 79,421 (May 11, 1990) (involving a bank acting solely as custodian);
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practices of groups of managed accounts have evolved. In 1972, the SEC's
Advisory Committee described the typical arrangement as one marketed to
investors who preferred not to invest in mutual funds.224 The SEC continued to
be concerned with managers who provided portfolio services, 2M but also with
sponsors who delegated management to others, including sponsors who
invested managed funds in mutual funds.226
In 1995, the SEC proposed a new rule 3a-4.22 7 The new rule is modeled on
the original proposal, but modified in light of the SEC's experience with no-
action letters. It would exclude certain investment management programs from
the definition of investment company.m Like the first proposed rule, the
central theme of the new proposal is an insistence on individualized
treatment. 229 The proposed safe harbor would be available to an investment
management program provided that:
(i) Each client's account be managed on the basis of the client's financial
situation, investment objectives, and instructions; (ii) the sponsor of the
program obtain information from each client that is necessary to manage the
client's account individually; (ii) the sponsor and portfolio manager be
reasonably available to consult with clients; (iv) each client has the ability to
impose reasonable restrictions on the management of the account; (v) each
client be provided with a quarterly statement containing a description of all
activity in the client's account; (vi) each client retain the indicia of ownership
of all securities and funds in the account; (vii) the sponsor establish and effect
written procedures that are reasonably designed to ensure that each of the
conditions of rule 3a-4 is met; (viii) if the sponsor designates another person to
perform certain obligations under the rule, the sponsor obtain from that person
a written agreement to perform those obligations; (ix) the sponsor maintain and
Manning & Napier Advisors, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCIH) 79,428 (Apr. 24, 1990) (outlining investment advisory service offered to
clients where each client would be the registered and beneficial owner of the securities and
retained custody); Jeffries & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCI-) 79,309 (June 19, 1989) (outlining personal money management service
offered by subsidiary of registered broker-dealer).
224 See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 62, at 6.
225 See Investment Company Act Release No. 21,260, supra note 62, at 86,966.
226 See id. at 86,966-67; see also Clarke Lanzen Skalla Investment Firm, Inc., 1995
SEC LEXIS 1508, at *13-15 (Jume 16, 1995); Balliett, Blackstock & Stearns, Inc., 1987 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 2359 (Aug. 19, 1987).
227 See, Investment Company Release No. 21,260, supra note 62, at 86,969.
2 See id.
229 See id. ("The revised proposed rule would include a number of conditions intended
to ensure that clients in programs that rely on the rule receive individualized treatment."); see
also id. at 86,970 (discussing provisions designed to ensure individualized treatment).
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preserve the policies, procedures, agreements and other documents relating to
the program in the manner set forth in the rule; and (x) the sponsor furnish to
the Commission upon demand copies of specified documents. 230
While the proposed rule would provide at least some investment managers
a clearly charted safe harbor from the Investment Company Act, several of its
particulars would limit its usefulness to investment managers. First, a condition
of the safe harbor is that the sponsor complete and file a form with the SEC. 23 1
Filing of this form is a condition of the safe harbor-if the form is not filed,
there is no exemption. 232 Thus, a sponsor who structures a program that
happens to satisfy the requirements of the rule but fails to file a form-perhaps
because it has not considered the possibility that it is an investment company-
will not have the safe harbor.233
In addition, the proposed rule provides a safe harbor only from the
Investment Company Act, not from the Securities Act or the Exchange Act.
However, the reason that investment managers have to worry about the
Investment Company Act is the possibility that the investment management
arrangements they offer may be securities, and the test of whether they are is
the same under the several federal securities statutes. 234 Accordingly, any
manager who needs proposed rule 3a-4 also needs protection from the other
statutes. The reason the proposed safe harbor is conditioned on a manager's
giving individualized attention is to assure that the management arrangement is
not a security. When the SEC proposed the rule, it recognized that if investment
management arrangements are securities they implicate all the federal securities
laws, not just the Investment Company Act, and it clearly intended that
managers who satisfy the conditions of the rule would not have to register
under the Securities Act.235 Nevertheless, the proposed rule only says that
230 Id. at 86,966; see also id. at 86,978-79 (containing text of proposed rule).
231 The form is quite short, and consists largely of identifying information about the
sponsor and a notice that the sponsor intends to rely on the rule 3a4 safe harbor. See id. at
86,979.2 32 See id.
233 In contrast, the Regulation D exemption from the registration requirement of the
Securities Act requires the issuer to file a Form D with the SEC, but failure to file does not
destroy the exemption. See Rule 503, 17 C.F.R. § 230.503 (1995). The form required by
proposed rule 3a-4 does not contain information that would be useful to investors, and even
the SEC justifies it only as a tool for monitoring compliance with the proposed safe harbor.
See Investment Company Act Release No. 21,260, supra note 62, at 86,976. However, by
requiring filing of the form as a condition of the safe harbor, the SEC would succeed in
retaining a jurisdictional hook on those availing themselves of the rule.234 See supra note 35; see also infra note 248 and accompanying text.
235 The preliminary note to the proposed rule expressly states that interests complying
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complying arrangements are not collectively an investment company; it does
not say they are not securities. Accordingly, the proposed rule does not extend
complying managers a safe harbor from the other federal securities statutes.
In any event, proposed rule 3a-4 offers only a safe harbor, not a complete
definition of the term "investment company." Even if the SEC eventually
adopts the rule, the status of managed accounts under the Investment Company
Act will remain unsettled and investment managers will remain at risk.
Investment managers who inadvertently create investment companies do risk
substantial legal sanctions. Although the law governing the status of managed
accounts as investment companies has developed largely in the context of SEC
no-action letters, the SEC does actively enforce the Investment Company Act.
The recently settled case of In re Clarke Lanzen %kalla Investment Firm,236
shows that managers sometimes still run afoul of the registration requirements
of the Investment Company Act, and that rather technical factors may
determine whether a program is an investment company or not. Clarke Lanzen
established about 360 accounts in what it called its "managed asset allocation
program."237 Customers chose among six different investment strategies, such
as aggressive, balanced, and conservative, each with its own predetermined
investment formula. After a customer chose a strategy, the customer's funds
were invested in various mutual funds, with the funds of all customers choosing
a particular strategy invested in the same funds. Customers gave Clarke Lanzen
discretionary authority, meaning that although customers retained authority to
change their investment strategies or liquidate, they had no contractual right to
instruct Clarke Lanzen to refrain from investing in a particular fund.23 8 The
investments of all the customers in a particular mutual fund were carried in a
single ommbus account in the custodian's name. Clarke Lanzen charged a set-
up fee and an annual fee based on assets under management. 23 9
The SEC instituted public administrative proceedings against Clarke
Lanzen under the Securities Act and the Investment Company Act.240 The SEC
found that the managed asset allocation program was an investment company,
and that Clarke Lanzen violated section 7(a) of the Investment Company Act by
with the rule need not be registered under the Securities Act. See Investment Company Act
Release No. 21,260, supra note 62, at 86,978, 86,969 EL26. Even if this note is binding as
part of the rule, managers would still be subject to the other provisions of the Securities Act
and the Exchange Act, including the antifraud provisions. See id. at 86,968 n. 18 (stating no-
action position of Division of Corporate Finance).236 Investment Company Act Release No. 21,140, 1995 SEC LEXIS 1508 (June 16,
1995).
237 Id. at *2.
23 8 See id. at *8-9.
2 39 See id. at*7.
240 See id. at*1.
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operating the program and offering interests therein without registering the
program under the Investment Company Act.241 The SEC followed the
reasoning of Citibank and its no-action progeny, reasoning that "[i]f clients of a
managed discretionary account program... do not receive individualized
advisory services and do not retain sufficient indicia of rights traditionally
associated with individual ownership of the securities purchased for their
accounts, the pool of nominally separate client accounts in the program may be
an investment company."242 The SEC applied the Howey test to determine
whether interests in the program were securities for the purposes of the
Investment Company Act, and concluded that they were, because the common
enterprise element was satisfied by virtue of the pooling of the investors' funds
and the fact that the advisory fees were based on the value of assets under
management. 24 3 This finding also dictated a finding that Clarke Lanzen had
violated section 5 of the Securities Act by offering and selling interests in the
program without registering them under that Act.24 4
If managed accounts are securities, few would argue that those accounts
should not be treated collectively as an investment company. The strongest
argument that the Investment Company Act does not apply to a group of
investment accounts classifiable as securities is that the Act was intended to
apply only to pooled management, and that most investment management
arrangements do not involve pooling. The SEC's Advisory Committee on
Investment Management Services for Individual Investors suggested this
distinction, taking the position, as noted above, that an individual who owns
securities in an investment account is so unlike the shareholder of a traditional
investment company as to justify treating them differently.245
That argument, although it has some appeal, is unlikely to prevail. The
distinction between pooled and nonpooled accounts finds no support in the
Investment Company Act unless the meaning of "organized group" in the
definition of "company" in section 2(a)(8) of the Act turns on whether the
securities belonging to investment accounts are separated from each other. Such
an interpretation, however, is sharply inconsistent with the SEC's insistence that
a collection of managed accounts is an investment company if the investors do
not receive individualized attention.24 6 If a group of managed accounts are
241 The SEC also found that the program violated section 12(d) of the Investment
Company Act by investing more than 10% of its assets in the securities of registered
investment companies. See id. at *13-15.
242 Id. at *10.
243 Id. at *12.
244 Id. at *9.
245 See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 62, at 22-24.
246 See supra Part II.A.4; infra note 260 and accompanying text. The SEC's position is
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sufficiently related to be statutory securities, they are almost certain to be found
to be sufficiently related to be members of an organized group.
Furthermore, the pooling-nonpooling distinction makes little policy sense,
since the opportunities for investment managers to perpetrate the abuses which
led to the passage of the Investment Company Act are not less likely simply
because accounts are not pooled.247 An investment manager willing to dump an
overvalued underwriting into a client's account will have more difficulty doing
so when portfolios are maintained separately than when they are maintained in
common. Similarly, an investment manager anxious to stimulate referrals by
broker-dealers might trade clients' portfolios more rapidly than they would
otherwise, regardless of whether the securities in each account are maintained
separately or in common.
In the end, the question of whether a set of managed accounts is an
investment company depends largely on the question of whether individual
accounts are securities.2 48 Particularly under a Howey analysis, the same
commonality that establishes an investment management operation as a statutory
security also establishes it as a statutory investment company. To be sure, the
SEC possesses discretionary authority to waive compliance with all or part of
the Investment Company Act, 249 and it could exempt managed accounts that
comply with some form of safe-harbor rule. However, the SEC uses its
discretionary exemption power sparingly and restrictively, 25 0 as the experience
of variable life insurance indicates,25 1 and, as discussed above, the SEC has
that investment management arrangements are securities if investors do not retain the indicia
of ownership of the assets in their accounts. See supra note 80. Investor retention of such
indicia is not enough to prevent an arrangement from being a security; the SEC insists on
individualized treatment as well.
247 See supra text accompanying note 11 (discussing declaration of policy in the
Investment Company Act).
248 Conversely, if the individual interests are not statutory securities, no collection of
such interests is an investment company. See Foundation Community Health Plan, [1974-
1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,150 (Jan. 23, 1975).
249 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (1994).
250 See Robert A. Robertson, The SEC Exemptive Process, 3 INV. LAW. 11 (May
1996).
251 The SEC had for some time maintained that variable life insurance ("VLI'), under
which benefits are determined according to the asset value of a portfolio of securities, was
itself a security and, therefore, that a set of VLI contracts constituted an investment company.
After much controversy, the SEC adopted Investment Company Act Rule 3c-4, and
Investment Advisers Act Rule 202-1, which exempted VLI from both of these statutes. Yet
the ensuing opposition by interest groups opposed to these blanket exemptions (particularly
the investment company industry) led to the qualification that state protective regulation
comparable to that under the two federal statutes must exist before a federal exemption would
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been slow to provide safe-harbor relief, and even the safe harbor it has
proposed is incomplete. 252 The complications and problems that the Investment
Company Act poses for investment management arrangements arise because
those arrangements are treated as securities. To avoid those complications and
problems, the extension of security status to investment management
arrangements needs to be limited in the first place. 253
IV. DEFINING SECURrIY STATUS ON THE BASIS OF
INDVIDUALI TREATMENT
If all courts extended the Howey definition of investment contract to
encompass managed accounts as easily as some have, the consequences for
investment managers would be enormous. Investment managers provide a wide
variety of services to large numbers of investors, often without ever considering
the possibility that these activities are themselves securities. Aside from the
mischief attendant to the SEC's selective exercise of its enforcement power,
managers who fail to register under the Securities Act may face a particular
risk, since under that Act buyers of unregistered securities can recover their
investments from their sellers. 254 If investment management arrangements are
securities, investors have a put against their investment managers for the
amount of their initial investments, regardless of how skillfully their
investments have been managed.
As outlined above, the law governing the characterization of investment
attach. See Investment Company Act Release No. 8000, [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCII) 79,518 (Sept. 20, 1973). Since most states do not have such comparable
regulation, and since most state insurance commissioners were not willing to have the SEC
involved in the regulation of insurance sold within their jurisdictions, VUI could not actually
be marketed. See generally Robert P. Blank et al., Variable Life Insurance and the Federal
Secriies Laws, 60 VA. L. REV. 71 (1974). The SEC then rescinded Rules 3c-4 and 202-1
and proposed instead to adopt a narrower exemptive rule under section 6(e). 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
6(e) (1994). See Bn;ns, supra note 97, 2.0411].
252 See supra notes 229-35 and accompanying text (discussing the proposed rule 3a4
safe harbor).
253 Because the definitions of security are the same in the Securities Act and the
Investment Company Act, see supra note 35, it would be difficult to limit the reach of the
Investment Company Act by treating managed accounts as securities under the Securities Act
but not under the Investment Company Act. See also supra note 235 and accompanying text
(discussing failure to include express safe harbor from Securities Act in proposed rule 3a-4).
254 15 U.S.C.A. § 771(a)(1) (1996 Supp.). Courts have found that a parallel right of
rescission is implied for purchases of shares of investment companies that have wrongfully
failed to register under the Investment Company Act. See HAzEN, supra note 13, § 17.10, at
1014-15.
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management arrangements as securities is cloudy at best. When the law began
to cloud, however, several important constituencies began to suggest that the
treatment of investment management arrangements under the securities laws
ought to turn on the extent to which managers provide individualized services.
This insight was not widely embraced at the time, but many of the cases and
administrative decisions addressing the status of particular investment
management arrangements under the securities laws tacitly respect a distinction
based on individualized treatment of investors. In any event, there are good
reasons for basing the characterization of investment management arrangements
as securities in the absence of individualized treatment of managed assets.
In 1970, the SEC's Advisory Committee on Investment Management
Services for Individual Investors suggested distinguishing investment
management relationships on the basis of individualized treatment. 25 5 The
Advisory Committee concluded that investment management services tailored
to the individual needs of an investor should not be regarded as a security, or at
least should be regarded as exempted private offerings. 25 6 While a private-
offering theory still leaves managers liable to securities fraud, 257 the concept of
individualization as a basis for avoiding security status has appeal.
Although the SEC never adopted the Advisory Committee's
recommendation in a formal rule,25 8 it has used individualized treatment as its
255 See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 62.
256 See id. at 24-25. The Advisory Committee took the position that in a case of true
individualization, the need for disclosure is less immediate than where securities of industrial
and investment companies are acquired, because close communication between client and
adviser provides a perpetual feedback mechanism for indication of the client's approval or
disapproval of investment decisions. The Committee also pointed out that the protective
devices found in the Investment Advisers Act and, to some extent, in the Exchange Act of
1934, would still check unsavory practices. Further, the Committee suggested a new Advisers
Act rule for these accounts, requiring the persons offering these services to give clients an
information statement as would be specified in such a rule. In the view of the Committee, an
information statement would be less costly, would afford greater flexibility as to content, and
would be subject to a less formal review process than would a Securities Act registration
statement, thus encouraging the growth of mini-accounts. See id. at 24-38.
2 57 The proposal to treat investment management arrangements as private placements
would be difficult to accomplish, at least under existing law, given the restrictions implicit in
the private offering exemption. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Nor would a
private-placement theory be of much use to commercial banks, because, although it suggests a
means for avoiding registration under the Securities Act, it concedes that managed accounts
are securities, so that the problem created by the underwriting prohibitions of the Glass-
Steagall Act may still exist. See supra note 149 (comparing the definition of security in the
Glass-Steagall Act with those in the securities statutes).
258 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5491, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 79,767 (Apr. 30, 1974) (requesting public comment on the role of the SEC
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basic test of determining whether a group of managed investment accounts is an
investment company. 25 9 Individualization is also the common thread uniting the
requirements of the safe harbor from investment company status in proposed
rule 3a-4.260 The test of individualized treatment is not simply a preference of
the SEC and its Advisory Committee; it comports with the substantial body of
law already addressed to the characterization of investment management
arrangements, and furthers the policies underlying the federal securities
laws.26 1
By requiring investment managers either to treat their managed accounts as
securities or to provide investors individual attention, a test of individualization
ensures that before committing to a manager, investors will receive either
extensive information immediately or the assurance of a close personal
relationship and a stream of pertinent information that will permit them to
evaluate their managers on a continuing basis.262 Moreover, while
in dealing with bank-sponsored investment services).
25 9 See Investment Company Act Release No. 21,260, supra note 62. Compare
International Asset Management, Inc., 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 294 (Jan. 29, 1990)
(declining to give no-action assurance to program with practical certainty of individual
treatment) with Benson White & Co., 1995 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 553 (June 14, 1995) (giving
no-action assurance to program in which sponsor represented it would offer individual
treatment) and Wall Street Preferred Money Managers, Inc., 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 648
(Apr. 10, 1992) (same) and West Am. Co. Inv. Co., 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1321 (Nov.
26, 1991) (same) and Morgan Keegan & Co., 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1168 (Oct. 2, 1990)
(same) and S.H. Dike & Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII)
80,246 (Mar. 21, 1975).
260 See Investment Company Act Release No. 21,260, supra note 62; see also supra
notes 229-35 and accompanying text (discussing proposed rule).
2 61 See supra Part lI.A.4. The SEC's Advisory Committee also considered the
applicability of the Investment Company Act to individualized accounts. Arguing that the
policies underlying the Securities Act and the Investment Company Act are not identical, the
Committee recommended that accounts not receiving individualized services be registered as
investment companies, while those receiving individualized services not be registered. See
Advisory Committee Repon, supra note 62, at 22-23. Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(13),
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(13) (1994), lends some support to the Committee's approach to
avoiding registration under the Securities Act and the Investment Company Act. It defines
"investment supervisory services" as "continuous advice" based on the "individual needs of
each client." Under section 208(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-8(c), only those persons a substantial
portion of whose activities consist of providing "investment supervisory services" may use
the title "investment counsel." By granting this trade advantage, Congress itself made at least
one important distinction in the area of investment management based on individualized
services.
2 62 See supra Part I.A.4. If prospective investors are to have sufficient information to
reach a considered judgment before they commit their money, it is important that investors be
[Vol. 58:459
NVWT1ENTMANAGMENT
individualization may not be subject to precise definition, and thus might be
difficult to define in particular cases, it is no less determinate than the other tests
of security that courts have crafted, and at least the SEC has developed a
substantial body of law distinguishing management programs on the basis of
individualized treatment of investors. 263 The SEC (or the courts) might also
develop more clearly stated guidelines if individualization were acknowledged
to be the critical question,264 and indeed proposed Investment Company Act
Rule 3a-4 provides a relatively clear definition of individualized treatment and
guidelifies for meeting it.2 65
In assessing the test of individual treatment, it is fair to recognize that the
manner in which an investment oppommity is promoted is often an important
background consideration in deciding whether that opportunity is a security.266
assured of individualized treatment before investment management arrangements are created.
To a substantial extent, this assurance can be provided by treating the way investment
management arrangements are promoted as a factor in the test of individual treatment that
determines whether they are securities. See bynra text accompanying notes 261-71. In
addition, a test of individualized treatment would require that, to avoid being treated as
securities, investment management arrangements must be structured to guarantee that
investors will receive individualized treatment after they have entered into those
arrangements. See supra text accompanying note 127. Regulation of promotion and creation
alone would be insufficient to assure individualized treatment, however, because a real test of
individualized treatment requires that the manager's behavior be assessed as the relationship
develops. This examination could be accomplished on an ad hoe basis or by the application of
clear standards of management similar to those articulated in proposed rule 3a4. See supra
notes 229-35 (discussing proposed rule 3a-4).263 See sources cited supra note 259.
264 The Advisory Committee recommended that the SEC publish guidelines on
individualized treatment and offered a list of criteria for the SEC to consider in doing so. See
Advisory Committee Report, supra note 62, at 27-32.
265 See Investment Company Release No. 21,260, supra note 62 (proposing rule); see
also supra notes 229-35 and accompanying text (discussing proposed rule).
266 Compare Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995) (holding that section 12(2)
of the Securities Act does not apply to privately negotiated secondary transactions) and
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) (holding that a unique, privately negotiated
profit-sharing agreement was not a security) with Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S.
681 (1985) (holding that sale of all the stock of a corporation was a sale of securities).
In holding that commingled agency accounts are securities for purposes of the Glass-
Steagall Act, the Supreme Court in Investment Co. nstitute v. Camp emphasized that they are
likely to produce promotional and performance pressures. 401 U.S. 617, 636-38 (1971).
Camp thus suggests that, at least in some contexts, the way an investment is marketed is
relevant to whether it is a security. Whatever might be said about the validity of the Supreme
Court's distinction between commingled agency accounts and other bank-sponsored
investment management arrangements, the Court did attempt to tie security status to concern
1997]
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Indeed, one might accurately say that a concern with marketing and
promotional practices pervades the cases dealing with the definition of
over the methods of promotion that banks might adopt.
Of course, banks do promote their investment management services-even those services
that are not securities-to both institutional investors, like pension and profit-sharing accounts,
and to individuals. Courts and commentators alike have spotlighted the tenuousness of the
Supreme Court's attempted distinction between commingled agency accounts and other bank-
sponsored and bank-managed investment services. See Langevoort, supra note 24, at 703-04.
The new structure of the banking industry makes a complete anachronism of Camp's
fiduciary rhetoric. One doubts that many sophisticated people today see the banker as
anything but a businessperson under pressure to sell products and generate profits-not a
likely source of "disinterested investment advice" unless that service is paid for.
Id.; see also Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 790 F.2d 925, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting
that banks likely face competitive pressures when they market collective trusts for IRAs, but
holding they are still not securities); John W. Church, Jr. & Richard B. Seidel, The Entrance
of Banks into the Field of Mutual Funds, 13 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 1175 (1972);
James G. Woltermann, Comment, National Banks and Mutual Funds: Where Can They Go
After Investment Company Institute v. Camp?, 60 KY. L.J. 757 (1972). Perhaps Camp
reflected less a response to the imperatives of the Glass-Steagall Act than to a decision that
bank entry into the provision of investment management services had come so far as to
require a general review by Congress. See Langevoort, supra note 24. Because, under a
literal reading of the statute, the sale of participations in commingled agency accounts could
easily be regarded as contrary to the statutory prohibitions against underwriting, and since the
Court knew that Congress was examining the commingled agency account issue in connection
with its hearings on amending the Investment Company Act, the Court's decision to hold the
line against further bank encroachments is entirely understandable, if perhaps somewhat
disingenuous. See, e.g., Hearings on Mutual Fund Legislation of 1967 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., Pt. 3, 1249 (1967); Mutual Fund
Amendments: Hearings on H.R. 11995, S. 2224, H.R. 13754, and H.R. 14737 Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 91st Cong., 139, 179, 456-58 (1969). The report of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 10-12, 23 (1969), indicated that Senate Bill 5224
proposed expressly to authorize banks or savings and loan associations to operate a collective
fund for managing agency accounts. The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, in its Report, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1970), refused to take a position whether
commingled agency accounts were considered permissible under the Glass-Steagall Act.
Recognizing that the Camp case was pending before the Supreme Court, however, the
Committee did take the position that if such accounts were permitted, they ought to be
regulated as investment companies. Both the House approach and the Senate approach were
eliminated in conference. See Conference Report, Investment Company Act Amendments of
1970, No. 163, 91st Cong., 28-29 (1970).
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"security." 267 Perhaps the security status of investment management
arrangements depends not only on a lack of individual treatment, but also on
how management services are marketed-how clients are sought, what
promises are made, what information is disclosed and withheld, and so forth.268
However, the question of marketing may be more of a refinement of an
individual-treatment test than a substitute for it.
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's approach in Howey. The
Court emphasized both the investors' passivity and the promoters' creation and
marketing of substantially similar, if not identical, interests in the orange-grove
scheme. These factors indicate an absence of both individual treatment and
public marketing. For investment management arrangements generally, on an
individual-treatment analysis, red flags for security status might include heavy
portfolio overlap 269 or joint management of a large number of accounts. 270 Yet,
these elements will almost always be present when a manager markets
investment management arrangements to many potential customers. 271 Once
again, making marketing practices dispositive of whether an investment
management arrangement is a security will, in the end, identify arrangements in
which investors are unlikely to receive individual attention. However the test is
phrased, individual treatment seems to be the key.
V. CONCLUSION
The general question of which investment management arrangements are
securities for purposes of the federal securities laws is important to the extent
267 See HAZEN, sura note 13, § 1.5, at 31 ("[A] reading of all of the relevant
[investment contract] cases leads to the conclusion that what is being offered may not be as
important as how it is being presented."); see also SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distribs., Ltd.,
388 F. Supp. 1288, 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (referring to defendants' "investment-oriented
advertising"); Advisory Committee Report, supra note 62, at 17; Carney, supra note 38;
FitzGibbon, supra note 38; cf. 17 C.F.R. § 230.151(a)(3) (1996) (establishing a safe harbor
for annuities that are not marketed primarily as investments).
268 C". Carney, supra note 38, at 364 (suggesting that courts use a two-step analysis in
defining securities).
269 See SEC Litigation Release No. 4534, 1970 SEC LEXIS 1195 (Feb. 6, 1970);
Finanswer America/Investments, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCM) 78,111 (Mar. 26,1971).270 See generally Advisory Committee Report, supra note 62.
271 See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 62, at 19 ("Mass merchandising of
discretionary accounts of relatively small size, through advertising in the mass media or
similar promotional efforts, was viewed with skepticism by the [SEC's] staff which believed
that such activities would probably be inconsistent with individualized investment advice and
services").
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that those laws affect the public interest, and the question of whether a specific
arrangement is a security is certainly important to the investment manager and
investors involved. Nonetheless, stating the law governing the general question
with any precision is difficult, and whether a particular investment management
arrangement will be treated as a security is often impossible to predict.
Although much of what appears to be discord in the case law is more
rhetorical than real, courts do disagree about what constitutes a security.
Moreover, authoritative determinations of security status have never been made
with respect to vast numbers of investment management relationships.
Nevertheless, certain factors do recur in authoritative determinations that
particular investment management arrangements are securities.
An investment management arrangement is more likely to be found to be a
security if the manager has made false statements of material facts relevant to
the underlying investments or has failed to disclose a substantial risk that the
investor will suffer if the manager's firn fails. Similarly, excessive optimism
about the prospect for gain from using a particular investment approach,
especially with insufficient reference to the risk of loss, can be an important
factor in establishing security status. 272 Finally, a generalized advertising
campaign, especially one going beyond mere solicitation of interest from
investors seeking personal investment counseling, may support an inference that
what is being offered is a security.
Undoubtedly, several forces push courts and regulators to hold investment
management arrangements to be securities. Dissatisfied investors who can
convince courts that managed accounts are securities can obtain relief under the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws if the underlying investments are not
securities-for example, when managers invest client funds in commodities or
precious metals. Even when the underlying investments are in securities, if an
investor can show that the managed account is itself a security, the Securities
Act provides a neat remedy for recovering the account's lost value without
showing that the manager was incompetent or engaged in fraud. If the
arrangement was not registered and the manager cannot prove an exemption,
then the investor can rescind under section 12(1).273 In contrast, the regulation
of investment management services under other federal securities laws,
particularly the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, is underdeveloped and offers
investors relatively little protection. Recoveries are thus less certain than under
the Securities Act, and litigation is likely to be more complex.
272 Cf. Dreyfus Gold Deposits, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,069, at 84,997 (Jan. 10, 1975) (withdrawing no-action
assurance after Dreyfus suggested that the SEC had "cleared [its] plan based on its purported
security, convenience, and inexpensiveness.").
273 15 U.S.C.A. § 771(a)(1) (1996 Supp.).
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From the point of view of the SEC, the Securities Act offers a useful
vehicle to police investment managers who offer services of doubtful merit and
managers who make technically accurate statements that are likely to take
advantage of investor nalvet6. By enjoining the marketing of an investment
program for nonregistration, 274 the SEC can pre-empt the use of programs it
believes may be fraudulent without proving fraud. In doing so, the SEC does
not so much perfect the disclosure philosophy of the securities laws to ensure
that investors have information before engaging investment managers, as it
completely prevents the marketing of services of which it disapproves.
The SEC's interests have predominated in the law governing whether
investment management arrangements are investment companies, because much
of the authoritative discussion of that question is contained in SEC responses to
requests for no-action assurance. In that context, the SEC has an incentive to
broadly construe the term security in order to maximize its jurisdiction, because
only if investment management arrangements are securities can collections of
such arrangements be subject to regulation as investment companies. 275 In
assessing what moves the SEC's general approach to the question of whether
investment management arrangements are securities, one should note that the
SEC has done little to assist investment managers who want to provide
information to prospective investors without running afoul of the registration
provisions. The SEC first proposed rule 3a-4 fifteen years ago and has never
issued a Securities Act registration form specifically tailored for the offering
and selling of investment management services and for responding to the needs
of persons interested in such services.
A final explanation for the intrusion of the securities laws into arrangements
between investment managers and their clients lies in the fragmentation of
federal regulation of investment management. 276 For some time, the investment
management activities of underwriters, broker-dealers, commodity trading
advisers, insurance companies, investment counselors, and banks have been
regulated by different regulatory authorities acting under separate administrative
regimes. Compartmentalized regulation of comparable activities has created
discontinuities that generate regulatory strain, and perhaps the natural response
has been for courts and the SEC to find a common basis for regulation under
the securities laws.
While these considerations may explain why various actors want investment
management arrangements to be treated as securities, they do not justify using
274 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(d), 80a-41(d) (1994) (authorizing SEC to seek
injunctions).
275 C. supra note 231 and accompanying text (discussing reporting requirement under
proposed rule 3a4).276 See supra Part I.B.
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an expansive definition of security to accomplish regulation of investment
management. Other remedies are available to deal with fraud in the marketing
of investment management services and fraud and mismanagement in their
operation, without adding a guarantee against investment failure under the
securities laws. Moreover, to the degree the SEC or private plaintiffs succeed in
applying the the securities laws selectively to offers of investment management
services, they also burden investment management arrangements which are
conducted honestly and properly.277
Nonetheless, the securities laws have a proper place in the regulation of
investment management arrangements when managers provide common
management service to various investors instead of tailoring management to the
needs of each investor. An appropriate balance between permitting investment
management practices to evolve and protecting the interests of investors can be
achieved by treating investment management arrangements as securities unless
managers act on the basis of each client's individual financial situation,
investment objectives, and instructions. Individualized attention is expensive of
course, and providing individualized attention to small investors on a profitable
basis may be impossible. Certainly, many managers faced with the cost of
complying with the securities laws would decline to offer nonindividualized
management services to small investors. Mutual funds, on the other hand, do
provide nonindividualized management services to small investors, and they do
so under a regulatory regime designed to protect those investors. Perhaps those
who desire nonindividualized investment management services ought to be
directed to mutual funds, and those who wish to provide such services ought to
comply with the regime that regulates mutual funds. In any event, that seems to
be the decision enacted in the securities laws, and that decision is effectuated by
treating nonindividualized investment management arrangements as securities.
277 In this regard, the quick enactment of the Philanthropy Protection Act is instructive.
See supra notes 188-97 and accompanying text.
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